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IN RESPECT OF PEOPLE LIVING IN A
PERMANENT VEGETATIVE STATE-
AND ALLOWING THEM TO DIE
Lois Shepherd
PROPOSAL
1. Recognize the person in a permanent vegetative state as a liv-
ing person with rights to self-determination, bodily integrity, and
medical privacy.
2. Recognize that people in a permanent vegetative state are not
like other people who are severely disabled in that they have abso-
lutely no interest in continued living.
3. Recognize that for people in a permanent vegetative state, the
current legal presumption in favor of indefinite tube feeding generally
does not allow their preferences or their interests to prevail; change
that presumption only for people in a permanent vegetative state to
favor discontinuing tube feeding.
4. Require judicial or quasi-judicial review of continued tube
feeding after a specified period of time following the onset of the per-
son's vegetative state, such as two years, well beyond the period when
diagnosis of permanent vegetative state can be determined to a high-
degree of medical certainty.
INTRODUCTION
When Terri Schiavo's feeding tube' was removed in March 2005,
some protesters went on hunger strike.2 Others placed red tape over
t D'Alemberte Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I
wish to thank Florida State University for its continued research support.
By "feeding tube," I refer to the means by which Terri Schiavo was
provided artificial nutrition and hydration, through a percutaneous endoscopic
gastromony (PEG tube), and other forms of artificial feeding. See generally David
Orentlicher & Christopher M. Callahan, Feeding Tubes, Slippery Slopes, and
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 389, 390-92 (2004) (providing
descriptions of various methods of artificial feeding); David Casarett et al.,
Appropriate Use of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration-Fundamental Principles and
Recommendations, 353 N. ENG. J. MED. 2607 (2005) (providing a general discussion
of current ethical guidelines and clinical practices regarding feeding tubes).
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their mouths with the word "life" written on it.' Children were ar-
rested trying to bring water to Terri in the hospice.4 The passions of
demonstrators favoring government action to reinsert her feeding tube
were publicly, visibly high.
What about those of us who thought she should be allowed to die?
Where was our passion? We had no slogan as simple and powerful as
"life." Championing the "rule of law" seemed uncaring and hollow;
and rules can be changed. Yet slowly and quietly, as Terri's case trav-
eled from the Florida legislature to the U.S. Congress, from state to
federal court, from the trial to the appellate level, and back and forth
and back again, people who favored the removal of her feeding tube
began to speak about Terri being "used" and "exploited," about her
being treated as a "pawn," a "thing," rather than a person. We began
to feel safe in expressing our own passion-in defense of Terri's pri-
vacy, her humanity, and her rights.
But this championing of Terri's humanity applies beyond her
case. The argument should be recognized as applicable to most people
in a permanent vegetative state and further, it should be recognized as
requiring a fundamental shift in the way we regard such people. The
terms of the debate over the legal treatment of people in a permanent
vegetative state require reordering.
Continued tube feeding of people in a permanent vegetative state,
unless they have indicated their preference for such, cannot be justi-
fied as an action taken in their interest. Rather, such feeding is done in
the interests of others, whether they be politicians or loved ones, or
certain members of the medical profession who believe feeding is
morally required, or society in general. The result is an instrumental
use of the person in a permanent vegetative state and even, at times, as
we saw in the recent Terri Schiavo controversy, an exploitation. Pho-
tographs and videotapes of Terri's slack mouth and vacant expression
were broadcast repeatedly on television and could be viewed at any
time, by anyone, over the internet.5 These images looked nothing like
2 See Daniel J. Hemer, Schiavo Case Spurs Hunger Strike, HARv. CRIMSON,
Mar. 23, 2005, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=506693;
Chris Tisch et al., Judge Greer Parts Ways with His Church on Pastor's Advice, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES ONLINE, Mar. 22, 2005, available at http://www.sptimes.com/
2005/03/22/Tampabay/JudgeGreerjarts-way.shtmi.
3 Kenneth Lovett & Deborah Orin, Anguished Prayers & Angry Chants as
Rival Protestors Square Off, N.Y. POST, Mar. 25, 2005, at 4.
4 See David Sommer, Charges Are Still Pending Against Schiavo Protes-
tors, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 13, 2005, Metro, at 6 (describing arrest of six children).
5 See Terri Schindler Schiavo Found, http://www.terrisfight.org (last visited
Mar. 3, 2006). On the website were several photographs and also videoclips of Terri
Schiavo in the condition in which she existed for many years, which the Florida cir-
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the attractive woman she used to be. While they were offered by her
parents in their fight to keep her alive, the broadcast of these images
demonstrated quite tragically that Terri was used as an instrument for
others' purposes, rather than treated as a person deserving of respect
and privacy. The U.S. Congress' attempt in March 2005 to issue a
subpoena for Terri's "testimony" before a congressional committee
6
and the sensational offers by private individuals of millions of dollars
to Terri's husband to relinquish guardianship to her parents7 were of
the same ilk. Could it really have been supposed that her public dis-
play in a congressional carnival would have counted as testimony?
Could her life or death been auctioned to the highest bidder?
These actions were justified by those who took them as being for
Terri's benefit. But there was no benefit to her in continued living.
She could not feel, see, hear, taste, smell, perceive, think, or experi-
ence life in any way at all, nor had she been able to for fourteen years,
nor would she ever again.' These actions were not for Terri's benefit.
Nor was she kept alive by tube feeding because she had made it clear,
prior to entering a state of permanent unconsciousness, that she would
want to continue living in such condition-perhaps to hold out hope
of a cure, however slim, or because she believed a good afterlife re-
quired it, or for any other personally held hopes, beliefs, or principles.
Instead, a court determined that there was clear and convincing evi-
dence that she would not have wanted to continue living in this condi-
tion.9 Our society was being neither benevolent, nor respecting her
cuit court determined, upon the evidence submitted by numerous doctors, was a per-
manent vegetative state. Id. There are also photographs of what Terri looked like
before the heart attack that led to her vegetative condition. Id. Videoclips of Terri are
no longer available on this website, but are available at the time of this printing on
http://www.blogsforteri.com/archives/video-of terri/ (last visited May 9, 2006). For
an analysis of the media use of the videos (and also to view two of the videos), see
Diane Waldman, Timely Triage: Schiavo Videos--Context and Reception, Jumpcut,
http://www.ejumpcut.org/currentissue/SchiavoWaldman/index.html (last visited May
9, 2006).
6 Phil Long et al., Terri Schiavo Case: Judge Rejects Congress' Subpoena,
MiAMi HERALD, Mar. 19, 2005, at IA. Pinellas Circuit Judge George Greer, who
presided over the Schiavo case from its inception, did not allow the Congressional
action to delay the removal of Terri's feeding tube. Id.
7 William R. Levesque, $1-Million Offered to End Husband's Role, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at I A (reporting statement by Michael Schiavo's
attorney that Michael had turned down at least three offers (of $700,000, $1,000,000
and $10,000,000) to remove himself from the guardianship role in Terri's case).
8 See infra Part II for a description of the permanent vegetative state and a
discussion of Terri Schiavo's diagnosis.
9 In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo I), 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (affirming trial court's determination that clear and convincing evidence
existed that Terri Schiavo would have wanted to discontinue tube feeding).
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right to self-determination, when we continued to tube feed her. In-
stead, she was kept alive for others' benefit and on the basis of others'
hopes, beliefs, or principles.
Even before the Florida governor,'0 Florida legislature," and U.S.
Congress 12 stepped into Terri's case to extend her life, she was living
for many years for someone else-namely her parents, Robert and
Mary Schindler. Through various legal challenges, they delayed the
removal of Terri's feeding tube from February 2000, when the first
court order permitting removal of the tube was issued, to March
2005.3 Emotional attachments such as these are understandable and
require our sympathetic and sensitive recognition. But at the same
10 The Florida Governor became involved in the case in a number of ways.
First, he pushed for the state legislature to pass "Terri's Law" in October 2003, which
permitted the Governor to order reinsertion of her feeding tube. See S.B. 12-E, H.B.
35-E (Fla. 2003). The Governor then became involved over the following year with
defending his action under Terri's Law, which Terri's husband, Michael Schiavo,
challenged as unconstitutional. That law was held unconstitutional by the Florida
Supreme Court in September of 2004. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004)
(holding that Terri's Law violated separation of powers principles). For a discussion
of the separation of powers principles involved in the case, see Barbara A. Noah,
Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 107, 116-20 (2004) (arguing that Terri's Law violated numerous Florida consti-
tutional provisions); 0 Carter Snead, Dynamic Complementarity: Terri's Law and
Separation of Powers Principles in the End-of-Life Context, 57 FLA. L. REv. 53
(2005) (arguing that the law did not violate separation of powers). Supporters of
Terri's parents sought the Governor's help again in March 2005 when a third removal
of her feeding tube was imminent and after it had been withdrawn. The Governor
sought to establish the right of Florida's Department of Children and Family Services
to place Terri in its custody on the grounds that she was being abused. Judge Greer,
who presided over Terri's case in the circuit court of Florida, blocked the Governor's
action. See Carol Marbin Miller, Plan to Seize Schiavo Fizzles, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
26, 2005, at IA.
l' See S.B. 12-E, H.B. 35-E (Terri's Law).
12 On March 21, 2005, Congress passed a law that stated that the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida shall have jurisdiction to hear a
suit regarding alleged violations of Terri Schiavo's constitutional or federal rights
regarding the "withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain
her life." The law also provided that the district court shall engage in "de novo" re-
view of such claims and disregard state court proceedings that had taken place. Relief
of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). The
district court denied the Schindlers' motion for a temporary restraining order to re-
quire reinsertion of Terri's feeding tube under the jurisdiction granted by Congress.
See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005),
afrd, 403 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2005).
13 For a detailed chronology of the controversy from the time of Terri
Schiavo's collapse in 1990 to December 2003, see JAY WOLFSON, A REPORT TO
GOVERNOR JEB BUSH AND THE 6T JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN THE MATTER OF THERESA
MARIE SCHIAvO (2003) (Wolfson was appointed the guardian ad litem to Terri
Schiavo in October 2003).
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time, we must acknowledge that they do not provide any benefit that
is experienced by the person in the permanent vegetative state, who,
again, cannot experience anything.
Individuals such as Terri Schiavo, who are permanently uncon-
scious, should be treated as the living persons they are. In respecting
them, we should honor their prior capacity for self-determination and
follow their wishes regarding continued medical treatment (including
artificial sustenance), if they can be determined. We should also re-
spect their rights to medical privacy by not allowing them to become
objects of public display. We should respect their bodily integrity by
providing proper hygiene and giving care to their appearance. Most
importantly, we should adhere to our fundamental obligation in re-
spect of persons, an obligation that is prior to and includes the more
particular duties to respect self-determination, privacy, and bodily
integrity, and that is the obligation to avoid allowing the instrumental
use of such individuals.
The instrumental use of permanently unconscious individuals is a
real and fundamental risk of any legal system for end-of-life decision-
making that is based upon a blanket presumption in favor of life. In
such a system, the interests of others in continuing such a person's
continued life, be they political, financial, medical, or familial inter-
ests, are too often allowed to trump.
In this article, I argue for a change in state laws that govern the
treatment of people in a permanent vegetative state. The Schiavo
controversy provides the medical and legal framework for probing the
weaknesses of existing law and considering possible reforms. My
proposal treats people in a permanent vegetative state as persons, with
rights to self-determination, bodily integrity, and medical privacy. But
it requires understanding that these people are in a special category;
they are not like the terminally ill or those who have already died (the
"brain dead"). They are also not like fetuses, or embryos, or people on
death row--despite comparisons made to Terri Schiavo by right-to-
life and other groups.' 4 Most importantly, they are not like other
14 See, e.g., Scarborough Country: Furnell Chatman, Pat Buchanan
(MSNBC television broadcast May 3, 2005) (linking Schiavo and abortion issues as
involving issues of preserving innocent human life); Josh Harkinson, Westward
Whoa! Stem Cell Restrictions Could Send Texas Medical Center Researchers Fleeing
to California, Hous. PRESS, May 19, 2005 (explaining that because states cannot
constitutionally prohibit abortion, "pro-life groups focus on related hot-button topics"
like Terri Schiavo's case and embryonic stem cell research). See generally JON
EISENBERG, USING TERRI: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT'S CONSPIRACY TO TAKE AWAY OUR
RIGHTS (2005) (describing the role of pro-life groups in the quest to keep Terri
Schiavo's feeding tube in place).
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people who are severely disabled and because they are not,
individualized, personalized assessments of the interests of the patient
in continued feeding can be replaced with a presumption that tube
feeding should be discontinued. Under my proposal, the surrogate's
role in such cases is reduced to bringing forward evidence, if it exists,
that the patient would have wanted continued tube feeding. Such
evidence can rebut the presumption against discontinuing tube
feeding. Review of decisions to continue feeding is required at regular
intervals by courts or accredited ethics committees to ensure that such
decisions are in conformity with patients' wishes.
In Part I of the article, I describe the characteristics of people in a
permanent vegetative state. In Part II, I explain that people in a per-
manent vegetative state have no interest in continued living and are
therefore distinguishable from other people who are severely disabled,
requiring the permanently vegetative unique legal consideration. Part
III explains how the current law fails people in a permanent vegetative
state by allowing them to be perpetually fed in service to the interests
of others. The kinds of interests that might improperly influence the
decision to continue tube feeding against the patient's interests and
preferences are discussed in Part IV. Part V explains how changing
the presumption in favor of discontinuing tube feeding better ensures
the effectuation of patient preferences and regard for the personhood
of people in a permanent vegetative state. Part VI addresses possible
objections to my proposal.
I. PEOPLE IN A PERMANENT VEGETATIVE STATE
The term "persistent vegetative state" was adopted in 1972 by
Drs. Jennett and Plum to describe patients who had, after trauma to
the brain, entered a continuing state of unconsciousness marked by
periods of wakefulness. 15 The term has been widely adopted by those
both inside and outside the medical community. 16 While originally
intended to signal a continuing, or persistent, condition, from which
recovery may or may not occur, the term has come to be associated
with a diagnosis of a permanent, rather than merely long-lasting con-
15 Bryan Jennett & Fred Plum, Persistent Vegetative State after Brain Dam-
age: A Syndrome in Search of a Name, 1972 LANCET 734, 736 (1972).
16 BRYAN JENNETT, THE VEGETATIVE STATE: MEDICAL FACTS, ETHICAL AND
LEGAL DILEMMAS 3 (2002). See also Am. Neurological Ass'n Comm. on Ethical
Affairs, Persistent Vegetative State: Report of the American Neurological Association
Committee on Ethical Affairs, 33 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 386, 386 (1993); Multi-
Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (First
of Two Parts), 330 N. ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1499-1500 (1994) [hereinafter Task Force
Report, Part I].
[Vol. 16:631
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dition.17 Recently, experts have suggested distinguishing the condition
of patients who have recently entered the state as "vegetative" and,
when the condition is considered irreversible on the basis of medical
criteria, to use the term "permanently vegetative."'
8
While there are no clear numbers of how many people live in a
permanent vegetative state in this country, estimates put the number at
between 10,000 and 25,000 adults and 6,000 to 10,000 children.' 9
There are four major characteristics of individuals in a permanent
vegetative state that are relevant in evaluating the appropriate legal
17 Id. at 5.
18 JENNETT, supra note 16, at 4-5.
In this article, I use the term "permanent vegetative state" to refer to the
condition at issue, which is the variant of vegetativeness that is considered irreversi-
ble. At times, the term "persistent vegetative state" is also used because state statutes,
court opinions, and commentators have used and continue to use this term, but unless
otherwise noted, the reference to "persistent" should not be understood as connoting
something other than a permanent condition. The term "permanently unconscious"
could also have been used, but that term might be understood as including individuals
in a coma from brain damage who do not emerge from that condition before death. Id.
at 2. After their death we can say that from the time of entering the coma they were
permanently unconscious, but that is different from diagnosing them as having en-
tered into a state of permanent unconsciousness with its attendant ethical and legal
issues.
A number of commentators have protested the use of the term "vegetative"
as demeaning because of its suggestion that the patient is something less than a per-
son, a mere "vegetable." See, e.g., Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Some Observations on
Post-Coma Unawareness Patients and on Other Forms of Unconscious Patients:
Policy Proposals, 16 MED. & L. 451, 461 (1997) ("the term 'vegetative' dehumanizes
the patients, suggesting that we speak of some form of sub-human life"); Adam J.
Hildebrand, Masked Intentions: The Masquerade of Killing Thoughts Used to Justify
Dehydrating and Starving People in a "Persistent Vegetative State " and People with
Other Profound Neurological Impairments, 16 ISSUEs L. & MED 143, 148-49 (2000)
(arguing that the term is "an insult to the inherent dignity of the human person").
While I am sympathetic to this argument, especially because my project involves
highlighting and appreciating the personhood of people in a permanent vegetative
state, nevertheless the terminology has become so widespread, with no alternative yet
achieving any significant use, that to use a different term may cause confusion. The
need for clear use of terms is imperative in this area so that any policy adopted is
applied only to those for whom it was intended. The condition of individuals who
have some degree of consciousness, even if they respond in a very limited and incon-
sistent way, should not be confused with patients in a permanent vegetative state. The
term as adopted as Jennett and Plum was intended to distinguish between such pa-
tients: "The former should be regarded as very severely disabled and not as in a lesser
degree of the vegetative state. Recently the terms minimally responsive state or
minimally conscious state have emerged to describe those patients who have regained
very limited conscious responses." JENNETrr, supra note 16, at 2 (citations omitted).
19 Quality Standards Subcomm., Am. Acad. of Neurology, Practice Parame-
ters: Assessment and Management of Patients in the Persistent Vegetative State
(Summary Statement), 45 NEUROLOGY 1015, 1015 (1994).
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rules for making decisions regarding their treatment: (1) such indi-
viduals are living persons; (2) they absolutely lack consciousness; (3)
their condition is permanent; (4) they may live for many years, even
decades, with artificially provided nutrition and hydration. 20 Each of
these characteristics and their relevance to questions of the law's re-
sponse to such individuals is discussed in turn.
A. People in a Permanent Vegetative State Are Living Persons
People in a permanent vegetative state are not dead under our cur-
rent medical and legal understanding of death.2' Despite a number of
newspaper articles that described Terri Schiavo as a "brain dead"
woman,22 she was not dead during the controversy that surrounded her
because her brain stem, which controls autonomic responses such as
respiratory and cardiac activity, was still functioning.23 The law in all
fifty states and the District of Columbia requires a complete lack of
brain function, including function within the brain stem, before brain
death has occurred.24
Arguments have been made for a number of decades, however, by
Robert M. Veatch and others, that such persons should be considered
dead because they have no higher brain function and only a function-
ing brain stem.25 Under such theories, consciousness or the possibility
of future consciousness would be required for a person to be consid-
ered living and thus the possessor of rights and interests that must be
respected. An obvious benefit of this proposed redefining of death
20 JENNET-r, supra note 16, at 66. See infra Part I.D.
21 Marcia Angell, After Quinlan: The Dilemma of the Persistent Vegetative
State, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1524, 1524-25 (1994).
22 See, e.g., Maya Bell, Florida Agency Won't Investigate Alleged Abuse of
Brain-Dead Woman, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB. (Minn.), Mar. 11, 2005; Florida Justices
Hear Right-to-Die Case; Court to Review New State Law Keeping Brain-Dead
Woman Alive, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 31, 2004, at 7A.
23 Angell, supra note 21, at 1524-25.
24 JANET L. DOLGIN & Lois L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 834
(2005). An individual whose death is determined on the basis of a lack of brain func-
tion cannot sustain cardiopulmonary function without mechanical aid. They may be
attached to such mechanical aids prior to the determination of brain death or even
after such determination in order to permit continued oxygenation of their organs and
tissues for transplant opportunities. Once they are withdrawn from the machines that
sustain their cardiopulmonary functions, their lungs no longer draw breath, their
hearts no longer beat, and they satisfy the traditional criteria for determining death-
the irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary function. Angell, supra note 21, at
1524-25.
25 See Robert M. Veatch, Brain Death and Slippery Slopes, 3 J. CLINICAL
ETHICS 181 (1992); Robert M. Veatch, The Dead Donor Rule: True by Definition, 3
Am. J. BIOETHICS 10, 10-11 (2003) [hereinafter Dead Donor Rule].
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would be the availability of the bodies of such individuals for organ
harvesting.
The argument to redefine death to include people in a permanent
vegetative state or others who are permanently unconscious has gen-
erally fallen on deaf ears and for good reason. The biological fact is
that the patient is breathing on her own, without any ventilator sup-
port, and therefore fits just about everybody's idea of what constitutes
"living., 26 As Marcia Angell wrote in 1994, they just don't "look
dead., 27 Moreover, removing the vital organs of such people would
clearly cause them to pass into another state-the state we universally
understand as death, where respiratory and cardiac function are irre-
versibly lost. Clearly, efforts to change the legal definition of death to
encompass individuals who have no higher brain function is less about
defining biological life and death and more about saying that we have
good reasons to exclude certain individuals from the community that
matters. The reality, however, is that for most people, individuals in a
permanent vegetative state, individuals like Terri Schiavo, do matter.
There may have been wide disagreement about what should be done
for Terri Schiavo, but she clearly counted as a person while living in a
permanent vegetative state.
Treating the person in a permanent vegetative state as a person
requires that we protect her from being treated merely as a means to
others' ends. In this article, I assume the truth of this fundamental
principle of the proper treatment of persons rather than debate its
merit. The principle has both ancient (Aristotle)28 and more modem
(Kant)29 philosophical exponents and has been a foundational assump-
tion of American jurisprudence relating to medical decision-making
and treatment of the human body.3° In fact, the reason a number of
26 See Howard Trachtman, Death Be Not Political, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 31,
31-32 (2003).
27 Angell, supra note 21, at 1525.
28 See Loren E. Lomasky, Person, Concept of, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS
1293, 1294 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 2d ed. 2001).
29 See John D. Arras et al., Moral Reasoning in the Medical Context, in
ETHICAL IssuEs IN MODERN MEDICINE 1, 14-17 (John D. Arras & Bonnie Steinbock
eds., 5th ed. 1999).
30 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the Supreme Court deter-
mined first the status of the fetus as a non-person before determining that a pregnant
woman has a right to an abortion). For a more recent example, see the discussion by
members of the President's Council on Bioethics regarding human cloning, which
presents the question of the status of the embryo as one whose outcome determined
members' views of the propriety of creating, using, and destroying cloned embryos
for medical research purposes. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING
AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL INQUIRY (2002), available at http://www.
bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/index.html.
20061
HEALTH MATRIX
scholars who advocate taking the organs of people in a permanent
vegetative state argue that such individuals are dead is to work around
the prohibition against using the person solely as an instrument for
others. 31 Instead of adopting wholesale utilitarianism, a moral phi-
losophy that would permit outright the use of some individuals for the
greater good, such scholars generally acknowledge and retain a certain
adherence to the principle that those who count as "persons" within
the moral community are "ends in themselves" and that respecting
them qua persons means disallowing their instrumental use.
Under my argument, and somewhat paradoxically, allowing the
permanently vegetative patient to die treats her more like a person,
respects her more as a person, than continuing to feed her and sustain
her life.
B. People in a Permanent Vegetative State Lack any Consciousness
While people in a permanent vegetative state are not dead, but liv-
ing people, they have no higher brain function, which means that their
senses are absent-all of them.32 According to a 1994 report of the
Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, comprised of representatives of
U.S. neurological and pediatric associations,33 people in a vegetative
state have a "complete unawareness of the self and the environ-
ment.' ,34 While the website that Terri's parents maintained included a
videotape that seemed to show Terri's eyes tracking a balloon and
Terri smiling in response to her mother's presence,35 those videotapes
were misleading. And every court who reviewed the complete (rather
than sound bite) evidence agreed.36 They showed moments taken from
31 See Dead Donor Rule, supra note 25, at 10- 11 (advocating an expansion
of the definition of death to include patients in a permanent vegetative state over
abandoning the dead donor rule as a strategy for allowing organs to be taken from
such patients).
32 For a description of the characteristics of people in a permanent vegetative
state, see JENNETr, supra note 16, at 7-32; Task Force Report, Part I, supra note 16, at
1499. See generally Quality Standards Subcomm,, supra note 19, at 1016.
33 Representatives of the following societies formed the Multi-Society Task
Force on PVS: the American Academy of Neurology, Child Neurology Society,
American Association of Neurological Surgeons, American Neurological Associa-
tion, and the American Academy of Pediatrics. The Task Force also consulted many
experts in medical and allied health fields, ethics, and law. The executive committee
of each participating society approved the Task Force Report. See Task Force Report,
Part I, supra note 16, at 1499-1500.
14 Id. at 1499.
35 See Terri Schindler Schiavo Found., supra note 5.
36 See In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo IV), 851 So. 2d 182, 186 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that the guardianship (or trial) court had reviewed
the videotapes, as had the appellate court: "We have repeatedly examined the video-
[Vol. 16:631
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hours and hours of videotaping in which Terri's eyes wandered with-
out purpose, without seeing, and in which her mouth showed all sorts
of expression, although they were not expressions relating to anything
going on around her.37 Such "activity" is consistent with the diagnosis
of a permanent vegetative condition. 38 Such patients are not asleep,
with their eyes closed, as many people may have supposed before
seeing Terri Schiavo on television or the internet. That is the condition
of people who are in a coma. A coma is a temporary state of uncon-
sciousness that a person may fall into after a head injury or similar
trauma.3 9 In fact, Terri entered a coma after the cardiac arrest that
caused her current condition.4° During that period she would have
appeared to have been asleep.4' But all patients who enter a coma ei-
ther then move into a state of some improvement (some degree of
consciousness), or move deeper into the stable and persistent condi-
tion of permanent vegetative state.42 The latter individuals exhibit
some movements that may make them appear to be conscious, which
is disconcerting to those around them. They have sleep and wake cy-43
cles, and during their wake cycles, their eyes are open. They may
have startle reflexes, where the body reacts to a sudden stimulation.
tapes, not merely watching short segments but carefully observing the tapes in their
entirety.... We have concluded that, if we were called upon to review the guardian-
ship court's decision de novo, we would still affirm it.").
37 Stephen Nohlgren, Schiavo Tapes: Snippets, Then Not Much, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at 1A.
38 According to Bryan Jennett, "[w]hat characterizes the vegetative state is
the combination of periods of wakeful eye opening without any evidence of a work-
ing mind either receiving or projecting information, a dissociation between arousal
and awareness." JENNETT, supra note 16, at 8-9.
39 For comparisons between persistent vegetative state and coma, see Task
Force Re t, Part I, supra note 16, at 1501-02
See WOLFSON, supra note 13, at 7.
42 See Task Force Report, Part I, supra note 16, at 1501-02.
42 See Task Force Report, Part I, supra note 16, at 1499.
43 Id. at 1500.
44 As Jennett writes,
[tihe limbs are usually spastic and they may move in a nonpurposeful way
and there may be groping movements. A grasp reflect may be set off by
contact with bedclothes, the nasogastric tube or the hand of an observer and
these may be misinterpreted as indicating voluntary movements or mean-
ingful responses, especially by relatives seeking evidence for recovery.
However, careful observation reveals no consistent movements that are vol-
untary or learned, or a response to command or mimicry.
JENNETT, supra note 16, at 14-15. In addition,
[m]ost patients show some response to painful stimuli. A stimulated limb
may withdraw or there may be a generalized movement of all four limbs,
sometimes accompanied by facial grimacing and perhaps a groan. There
may also be a rise in respiratory and pulse rates and in blood pressure. It is
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For family members who love the patient, who seek any sign that the
person they love is still able to perceive them, it can be very difficult
to accept that these activities do not signal understanding or percep-
tion. The belief they sometimes hold that their loved one is somehow
"locked in" is, unfortunately, false.4 5 In fact, over time, the lack of
function in the higher brain of the patient in a permanent vegetative
state reveals itself in an atrophy of brain tissue. A scan of Terri
Schiavo's brain showed that by 1996, six years after she had entered a
permanent vegetative state, "much of her cerebral cortex [was] simply
gone and [had] been replaced by cerebral spinal fluid.' '46 After her
death, an autopsy confirmed this conclusion.47
The Terri Schiavo controversy brought to public attention another
medical condition, the minimally conscious state, which Terri's par-
ents and others eventually claimed she was in. The critical difference
between a minimally conscious state and a permanent vegetative state
is that the former condition involves some level of cognitive function,
while there is no evidence of cognition associated with the permanent
48
vegetative state.
generally held that these responses are all at reflex level and do not indicate
that pain is being experienced on a conscious level.
Id. at 15.
45 With "locked-in" syndrome, the patient is paralyzed, but has not lost sen-
sation or cognition. Such patients generally have limited eye movement and can blink
to communicate in a yes/no code, revealing their cognition. Id. at 20-21. As Jennett
writes, "[s]killed neurologists seldom have difficulty in distinguishing this condition
from the vegetative state, and, in any event, the history of causation is usually quite
different." Id. at 21.
46 In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo I), 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2001).
47 See Jon Thogmartin, Report of Autopsy of Theresa Schiavo, Case
5050429 (June 13, 2005), available at http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/061505-
autopsy.pdf; C. Christopher Hook & Paul S. Mueller, The Terri Schiavo Saga: The
Making of a Tragedy and Lessons Learned, 80 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1449 (2005)
(summarizing autopsy results, including fact that Terri's brain weighed less than half
the expected weight of a person her age).
48 The criteria for diagnosing the minimally conscious state, as recently
developed by a group of experts, are as follows:
Evidence of limited but clearly discernible self or environmental awareness
on a reproducible or sustained basis, by one or more of these behaviours:
1. Simple command following
2. Gestural or verbal 'yes/no' responses (regardless of accuracy)
3. Intelligible verbalization
4. Purposeful behaviour including movements or affective behaviours
in contingent relation to relevant stimuli; examples include:
(a) appropriate smiling or crying to relevant visual or linguistic
stimuli
642 [Vol. 16:631
IN RESPECT OF PEOPLE
That Terri Schiavo was in a permanent vegetative state was con-
firmed by several highly qualified board-certified neurologists.49 In
2000, when the trial court ordered the first removal of Terri's feeding
tube, it did so after hearing evidence regarding her medical condition
and her wishes with respect to discontinuation of treatment.50 Another
lengthy hearing was held in 2002 at the instigation of the Schindlers,
at which "each side had ample opportunity to present detailed medical
evidence, all of which was subjected to thorough cross-
examination."5 The appellate court, reviewing the evidence and af-
firming the trial judge's determination that Terri Schiavo remained in
a permanent vegetative state, stated that "[i]t is likely that no guardi-
anship court has ever received as much high-quality medical evidence
in such a proceeding.52 In this hearing, five doctors were asked to
evaluate Terri's condition-two chosen by Michael Schiavo, two by
the Schindlers, and one by the court.53 The court found convincing the
testimony given by the doctors chosen by Michael Schiavo and by the
court, which attested to Terri Schiavo's permanent vegetative condi-
tion. 54 The testimony offered by the two doctors chosen by the
Schindlers regarding Terri's likelihood of improvement was not actu-
ally very different from the testimony offered by the other doctors,
and to the extent it did differ, it was not persuasive.
55
(b) response to linguistic content of questions by vocalisation or
gesture
(c) reaching for objects in appropriate direction and location
(d) touching or holding objects by accommodating to size and
shape
(e) sustained visual fixation or tracking as response to moving
stimuli.
JENNETT, supra note 16, at 24 (citing Joseph T. Giacino et al., The Minimally Con-
scious State: Definition and Diagnostic Criteria, 58 NEUROLOGY 349, 351 (2002)
(outlining the criteria this group of experts propose as a standard for the health profes-
sion)).
49 This includes the two doctors who originally certified her condition, which
provided support for Michael Schiavo's original petition to have Terri's wishes re-
garding nutrition and hydration be determined. Three doctors testified that Terri was
in a permanent vegetative state in the hearing described below.
50 The medical evidence is described in In re Guardianship of Schiavo
(Schiavo II), 792 So. 2d 551, 554, 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
51 In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo IV), 851 So. 2d 182, 185 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming the trial court's decision, following this hearing, that
the Schindlers had not established that new treatments offered the possibility of im-
provement in Terri's condition such that she would elect to undergo such treatments).
52 id.
51 Id. at 184.
14 Id. at 185.
51 Id. at 184-85. "Although the physicians are not in complete agreement
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The accuracy of the diagnosis is very important under existing
Florida law because, like the "end of life" statutes in some other
states, Florida's statute makes clear that permanent vegetative state is
one of the conditions in which life-sustaining treatment, including
artificially provided nutrition and hydration, can be withdrawn.56 The
treatment of a person in a coma would not be covered by Florida's
statute, nor would someone who is severely disabled, but stable-in
other words, someone who can still experience life in some manner,
however meager that experience may be.
57
The accuracy of the diagnosis is also important under the reforms
that I propose. My argument for changing some of the substantive and
procedural guidelines for withdrawing tube feeding from individuals
in a permanent vegetative state depends upon the lack of any present
or future perception of the patient-in other words, permanent uncon-
sciousness. This proposal, like current law, does not cover individuals
who are severely disabled but still experience some feelings or
thoughts. Such individuals merit separate and different consideration
because proposals to discontinue feeding in those instances requires
figuring out how to weight or value those experiences. The law in
many states, including Florida, makes a sharp distinction between
individuals who have no experiences (i.e., those in a permanent vege-
tative state) and individuals who have minimal experiences, by includ-
concerning the extent of Mrs. Schiavo's brain damage, they all agree that the brain
scans show extensive permanent damage to her brain. The only debate between the
doctors is whether she has a small amount of isolated living tissue in her cerebral
cortex or whether she has no living tissue in her cerebral cortex." Id. at 184. The
Guardian Ad Litem's report states, "Of the two physicians testifying for the
Schindlers, only one was a neurologist, the other was a radiologist/hyperbaric physi-
cian. The testimony of the Schindler's [sic] physicians was substantially anecdotal,
and was reasonably deemed to be not clear and convincing." WOLFSON, supra note
13, at 16.
56 Permanent vegetative state is one of three such conditions-the others
being a terminal condition and an end-stage condition (such as advanced Alzheimer's
disease). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.304(2)(b) (West 2005) (requiring one of these condi-
tions be present before proceeding with a living will); § 765.305 (limiting the decision
to withdraw life-prolonging treatment by patient-appointed surrogate to these three
conditions); § 765.401 (similar limitation for surrogate designated through statutory
priority list). The Florida statute uses the term "persistent vegetative state" rather than
permanent vegetative state, but defines it as "a permanent and irreversible condition
of unconsciousness in which there is: (a) The absence of voluntary action or cognitive
behavior of any kind. (b) An inability to communicate or interact purposefully with
the environment." § 765.101(12).
57 Certain kinds of treatment might be foregone in such instances, and in fact,
patients might have a constitutional or common law right to have such treatment
withdrawn, but the Florida statute does not place its imprimatur of approval on such
decisions with its grant of immunity to those who engage in such decisions.
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ing the former in "end of life" statutes, but excluding the latter.5
There are some good reasons to maintain those distinctions, as will
become clear.59
Scientific inquiry consistently brings new discoveries, and if in
the future we were to learn either that (1) people in what we now call
a permanent vegetative state do actually have some degree of mean-
ingful perception or (2) people in a permanent vegetative state have a
reasonable probability of recovering some degree of meaningful per-
ception, then my proposal would need reevaluation. It is based upon
the permanent lack of consciousness.
C. The Lack of Consciousness of People in a Permanent Vegetative
State Is Permanent
To call the prognosis of the patient in a permanent vegetative state
"dim" would be an overstatement. The very definition of the condition
requires that it be permanent, irreversible. The diagnosis is not prop-
erly entered until sufficient time has passed to preclude any reason-
able probability of recovery. 60 In 1994, the Multi-Society Task Force
determined that a judgment that a vegetative state was permanent
could be made twelve months after a traumatic injury in adults and
children, and after three months when the cause of the condition was
nontraumatic. 1 Recovery after this time is extremely rare.62
Under my proposal, the presumption that tube feeding should be
discontinued would not be applicable until a prognosis of permanence
could be made. Moreover, the part of the proposal that requires judi-
cial or quasi-judicial review of continued tube feeding (the part of the
proposal that prevents surrogates from indefinitely ordering tube feed-
ing without evidence of patient preferences for it) would not apply
until a certain specified time after the vegetative condition has been
entered, such as two years, which is well beyond the guidelines that
physicians follow in making a determination of permanence.
58 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.305(2)(b) (West 2005) (requiring surrogate to be
satisfied that the patient is in an end-stage condition, persistent vegetative state, or.
that the patient's condition is terminal); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(3) (West 2005)
(requiring statutorily designated surrogates, or proxies, to meet the standards of
§ 765.305).
59 See supra Part II.
60 Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vege-
tative State (Second of Two Parts), 330 N. ENG. J. MED. 1572, 1575 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Task Force Report, Part II].
61 Id.
62 Id.
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It is true that there have been reports of late recoveries. In review-
ing thirty media reports of alleged late and unexpected recoveries
from either a prolonged coma or a vegetative state, the Multi-Society
Task Force discovered that in fifteen of those cases, recovery had in
fact occurred prior to the recommended period for determining per-
manence. 63 Only two of the remaining cases appeared (on the basis of
the limited information available) to be definitely vegetative; each of
these recovered five months after a nontraumatic injury. Nine of the
cases were definitely not vegetative, and the other four only possibly
vegetative. 64
The Mutli-Society Task Force also considered medically verified
late recoveries, but found similar problems with the data.65 Again,
some of the alleged late recoveries appear to have been late discover-
ies of recoveries that had actually taken place before the recom-
mended guidelines for determining permanence. 66 The Multi-Society
Task Force recognized, however, that a rare late recovery is possible,
explaining that "like all clinical diagnoses in medicine, [diagnosis of a
permanent vegetative state] is based on probabilities, not absolutes. 6 7
But the data were sufficient, in the Multi-Society Task Force's view,
to make distinctions between vegetative states that could only be con-
sidered persistent and those which could be considered irreversible,
and thus permanent:
A patient in a persistent vegetative state becomes permanently
vegetative when the diagnosis of irreversibility can be estab-
lished with a high degree of clinical certainty-that is, when
the chance that the patient will regain consciousness is ex-
ceedingly small. We believe there are sufficient data on the
prognosis for neurologic recovery to allow us to distinguish
between persistent and permanent vegetative states. These
data, in conjunction with other relevant factors in an individ-
ual patient, can be used by a physician to determine when the
persistent vegetative state becomes permanent-that is, when
a physician can tell the patient's family or surrogate with a
high degree of medical certainty that there is no further hope
63 Jennett summarizes this work of the Task Force. See JENNETT, supra note
16, at 63.
64 Id. at 63 (explaining how the Task Force used a sample of thirty media
reports to explore single-case examples which defied their official recommended
.periods of expected recovery).
65 Id. at 63-64.
66 Id. at 64. See also Task Force Report, Part II, supra note 60, at 1575.
67 Task Force Report, Part I, supra note 16, at 1501.
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for recovery of consciousness or that, if consciousness were
recovered, the patient would be left severely disabled.68
As with nearly all decisions regarding medical diagnosis and
treatment, 100 percent certainty is not possible. But we should not
allow an exceedingly small possibility of recovery from a condition of
permanent vegetativeness, 69 or the possibility of mistaken diagnosis,
70
to permit continued tube feeding for the thousands of people who are
properly diagnosed as being in a permanent vegetative state on the
basis of clear and conservative clinical guidelines.71
D. People in a Permanent Vegetative State May Live for Many Years
While the prognosis for someone in a permanent vegetative state
ever recovering any ability to experience life is so extremely poor that
it is, for all intents and purposes, zero, the prognosis for continued
68 Id. In those rare instances where a late recovery may have occurred ("late"
meaning past the recommended guidelines for a declaration of permanence, which the
Task Force placed at three months for nontraumatic injury; twelve months for trau-
matic injury), "recovery" was almost always to a condition of very severe disability,
such as a "minimally conscious state or slightly better." JENNETT, supra note 16, at
64.
69 If this rare occurrence took place, it would be merely into a condition of
very severe disability, such as a minimally conscious state.
70 The Task Force Report acknowledges that we cannot be absolutely certain
there is no consciousness; that judgment requires inferring "the presence or absence
of conscious experience in another person." Task Force Report, Part I, supra note 16,
at 1501. "[I]t is theoretically possible that a patient who appears to be in a persistent
vegetative state retains awareness but shows no evidence of it. In the practice of neu-
rology, this possibility is sufficiently rare that it does not interfere with a clinical
diagnosis carefully established by experts." Id.
71 As an example of the conservative nature of the guidelines established by
the Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, its report cautions against diagnosing a vegeta-
tive state when there is any degree of sustained visual pursuit although it may not
evidence consciousness:
Sustained visual pursuit is lacking in most patients in a vegetative state.
They do not fixate on a visual target, track moving objects with their eyes,
or withdraw from threatening gestures.... However, patients in a vegeta-
tive state often have inconsistent primitive auditory or visual orienting re-
flexes, characterized by a turning of the head and eyes toward peripheral
sounds or movements. In rare cases, patients who have no other evidence of
consciousness over a period of months to years have some degree of briefly
sustained visual pursuit or fixation, which is believed to be mediated
through brain-stem structures. Nevertheless, one should be extremely cau-
tious in making a diagnosis of the vegetative state when there is any degree
of sustained visual pursuit, consistent and reproducible visual fixation, or
response to threatening gestures.
Task Force Report, Part I, supra note 16, at 1500-01.
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existence is not as bad, at least for someone who has survived in a
permanent vegetative state for over one year. If given good nursing
care, the person in a permanent vegetative state can live for thirty or
more years.72 Part of this nursing care consists of artificially provided
nutrition and hydration, usually through a percutaneous endoscopic
gastrostomy (a PEG tube), which is surgically inserted directly into
the stomach. 73 Individuals in a permanent vegetative state cannot co-
operate with spoon or straw feeding. It may be technically possible to
feed some such patients by spoon or straw, but there will be no con-
scious response from the individual 74-and such efforts will really
amount to forcing food down the throat of the individual, an intrusion
of bodily integrity that may even appear more invasive than the inser-
tion of a feeding tube.
II. PEOPLE IN A PERMANENT VEGETATIVE STATE
HAVE NO INTEREST IN CONTINUED LIVING
My argument for a presumption against perpetually tube feeding
people in a permanent vegetative state rests on the fact that continued
existence serves no present or future interests of the person. Continu-
ing tube feeding in the absence of evidence of the patient's wishes is
thus an act of improper instrumental use of the person. If life is not
being continued for the benefit of the patient, then it is being contin-
ued for the benefit of others.
The argument that people in a permanent vegetative state have no
interest in continued living is not new. A number of commentators
have recognized this lack of interest because such a person cannot and
never will experience life in any way.75 In other words, they will
72 JENNETr, supra note 16, at 66. There have been reported cases of individu-
als living thirty-seven and forty-one years. Id. The Task Force reported that survival
beyond ten years was unusual, but its data may have placed estimates at long-term
survival too low. Id. Jennett describes how the publication of the Task Force Report
provoked a number of letters protesting these numbers, some of which pointed out
that they may have been based on deaths that resulted from decisions to limit treat-
ment. Id. at 67. A similar response followed a British documentary on permanent
vegetative state in 1994, in which of 458 members of the public who called in stating
that they were related to family members in a vegetative state, seventy-eight reported
that their relative had been in a vegetative state for more than ten years. Id. at 66-67.
73 Id. at 88. A nasogastric tube (which is inserted through the nose) is also
sometimes used, especially in the early period of vegetativeness. Id.
71 See id. at 18.
75 See, e.g., ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS:
THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 126-129 (1989); and Rebecca Dresser,
Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in
the Law, 28 ARiz. L. REV., 373 (1986).
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never perceive what is going on around them or what is happening to
them. They also unfortunately completely lack an "inner life" as
well-in terms of memories or musings or dreams.
Continued feeding in such instances is not required for the pur-
pose of benefiting the patient because continued life does not benefit
the patient in any way that can be experienced. Interests of this sort,
which can be experienced by the patient, are frequently called "expe-
riential interests.
' 76
This complete lack of experiential interests is what makes the
condition of the permanent vegetative state unique and calls for ap-
propriately unique ethical and legal consideration. Such consideration
means first that people in a permanent vegetative state can be, should
be, and must be treated as a unique class with respect to how we think
of the benefit to them in tube feeding because they all have the same
complete lack of experiential interests. Second, the complete lack of
interest in continued living means that people in a permanent vegeta-
tive state are not like other severely disabled individuals who, because
of their varying capacities to experience life, cannot be treated as a
class and do have specific, individual interests in continuing to live.
As a result, the class of persons who are permanently vegetative must
be treated differently from other severely disabled individuals.
For example, we do not need to ask for people in a permanent
vegetative state, how much are they suffering? Would a few more
days of life be a valued experience to the patient? Will the feeding
tubes disturb the patient? There is no such difficult individualized
assessment for the vegetative patient-feeding by tube is relatively
simple and effective in prolonging the life of the individual in a per-
manent vegetative state. Removal of the feeding tube will undoubt-
edly cause death within a period of weeks. The analysis is always the
same-simple feeding mechanisms continue life; removal causes
death. The feeding tubes are not experienced by people in a permanent
vegetative state in any way, nor is the life that they gain by such feed-
ing tubes.
While we should recognize that any individualized assessment of
the experiential interests of the permanently vegetative patient is un-
necessary, that does not mean that we should discard an individual-
ized assessment of what they would want done in this situation. The
law governing end-of-life decision-making does and probably should
continue to respect the wishes of the patient; to the extent they can be
76 See supra Part H.A.
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discerned.17 The reforms that I propose maintain deference to the in-
dividual wishes of the patient.
Sometimes, in the more theoretical of discussions about patients'
interests at the end of life, a distinction is made between experiential
interests, which people in a permanent vegetative state clearly do not
have, and other interests that a patient may have.78 Arguments have
been made that these other sorts of interests, which people in a
permanent vegetative state may possess, should be factored into a
decision whether or not to continue life-prolonging treatment.79 For
example, in his book Life's Dominion, Ronald Dworkin distinguishes
between a person's "experiential" interests and "critical" interests.
80
While Dworkin agrees that people in a permanent vegetative state
have no "experiential" interests, he argues that they may nevertheless
have "critical" interests-interests that their lives as a whole be
successful according to certain critical judgments that they as
individuals at one time possessed.8' For example, a person may
believe that to have a successful life includes being remembered as an
independent, alert, dignified person. Forgoing life-prolonging
treatments in a state of dependency may be in keeping with that earlier
judgment. Another person may believe that a successful life would
entail staying alive with "the virtue of defiance in the face of
inevitable death., 82 The critical interests of the latter person may be
respected by continuing, rather than forgoing, life-prolonging
treatment.
Philosophers Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock have identified a
similar way of looking at the interests of people in a permanent vege-
tative state that are not limited to their experiential interests. They say
that some people, prior to entering a vegetative state, may have "had
certain future-oriented interests which will be satisfied or thwarted
depending on what happens to him or her after becoming permanently
unconscious." 83 Thus, according to Buchanan and Brock, a person
may have an interest in being sustained in a permanent vegetative
state for some time because of religious values.
84
77 See generally infra Part III.
78 RONALD DwORKN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 201-213 (1993).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 213.
83 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 75, at 129.
84 id
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Under my view, non-experiential interests of the "critical" or "fu-
ture-oriented" sort are important, but are better understood as patient
preferences rather than interests per se. I do not, therefore, treat them
as true present or future interests in continued living that would be a
part of a best interests' analysis. Instead, evidence about the views the
patient may have had about life in a permanent vegetative state is the
sort of evidence that should be brought to bear on a surrogate's under-
standing of the patient's preferences and the surrogate's decision
about whether continued feeding is in accordance with or contrary to
the wishes of the patient.
But I would caution against-and my proposal does not at all re-
quire-making any generalizations about what people's critical or
future-oriented interests may be. There may be a temptation to con-
sider interests in dignity, for example, or interests in being remem-
bered in a pre-disability state as so common and universally possessed
that we should consider existence in a permanent vegetative state it-
self as a burden in respect to these interests. In other words, some
would argue that there are burdens to the continued life of a person in
a permanent vegetative state, burdens of humiliation, dependence, and
indignity. 85 The patient has an interest, under this argument, in avoid-
ing these burdens by dying.
Admittedly, there is something compelling to this line of argu-
ment, and (again) if we are trying to figure out what the person would
want if she could now tell us, these might be some of the things she
would say. But adding this "burdens to living" component to the
analysis is not necessary. It is not necessary because the absence of
benefit alone is enough to discontinue life-prolonging treatment for
people in a permanent vegetative state unless there is sufficient evi-
dence of their contrary wishes. It is enough because if tube feeding is
not done to benefit the people who are fed, then it is done to benefit
other people, thus constituting an unacceptable instrumental use of the
person.
Understanding people in a permanent vegetative state as being
"burdened by life" is an approach which could apply just as well to
those who are severely disabled but conscious and opens the door to a
set of objections that should not be faced in treatment questions about
the permanently vegetative. It is important to understand the sharp
differences between the conditions of the permanently vegetative and
the severely disabled with some consciousness. Two very difficult
issues are embedded in end-of-life decision-making about the severely
85 See Norman L. Cantor, The Permanently Unconscious Patient, Non-
Feeding and Euthanasia, 15 AM. J. L. & MED. 381, 414-15 (1989).
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disabled that support a more cautious approach to discontinuing
treatment for such individuals than for patients in a permanent vegeta-
tive state.8 6 First, a decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment for a
severely disabled individual may involve, or may be perceived as in-
volving, unacceptable judgments about the quality and value of the
person's life vis-i-vis her abilities. Concerns about a life without dig-
nity also suggest an inhospitability toward dependency, with poten-
tially negative consequences toward those who are dependent.87
Second, if a decision to terminate treatment is made on the basis
of the individual's living will 8 8 or other pre-disability statements about
the undesirability of continued life in a certain condition, then the
individual's pre-disability autonomy might be given preferential
weight over the individual's post-disability interests, and it is not clear
that this should be so. With the terminally ill, this trumping of "criti-
cal interests" over "experiential interests" has become fairly accepted,
as long as present interests in comfort are maintained.89 In other
words, life-sustaining treatment might be removed from a patient with
only a few weeks to live on the basis of his formerly expressed
wishes, even though he still retains some level of consciousness and
might be said to benefit from continued life. But we do not generally
allow withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from the severely dis-
abled who are not permanently unconscious or not terminally ill,
unless the treatment itself causes severe suffering. 90 There is more at
86 The law of most states does not provide for the discontinuation of life-
sustaining treatment for severely disabled patients who are neither terminally ill nor in
a persistent vegetative state. Such patients may still have a constitutional or common
law right to discontinuation of treatment, but no statutory immunity is granted for
those involved in a decision to terminate treatment. In some ways, this lack of immu-
nity suggests that discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment for such individuals
would not be appropriate absent extraordinary circumstances.
87 See generally Lois Shepherd, Face to Face: A Call for Radical Responsi-
bility in Place of Compassion, 77 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 445 (2003); and Lois Shepherd,
Dignity and Autonomy after Washington v. Glucksberg: An Essay about Abortion,
Death, and Crime, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 431 (1997-1998).
88 A "living will" generally denotes a written document that provides instruc-
tions regarding the continuation of life-sustaining treatment in certain conditions,
such as a terminal illness or permanent vegetative state.
89 See infra Part III. For example, Florida law excludes from the definition of
"life-prolonging procedures" that can be withheld or withdrawn "the administration of
medication or performance of medical procedure, when such medication or procedure
is deemed necessary to provide comfort care or to alleviate pain." FLA. STAT. ANN. §
765.101Q0) (West 2005).
See Kathy L. Cerminara, Critical Essay: Musings on the Need to Convince
Some People with Disabilities that End-of-Life Decision-Making Advocates Are Not
Out to Get Them, 37 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 343, 379-81 (2006) (stating that courts have
been more cautious in approving decisions to withhold treatment from patients who
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stake in these cases-more life would be foregone, life that may be
experienced. In such cases, a surrogate's decision to forego treatment
is much more problematic, even when based upon the patient's pref-
erences when competent, because the individual can experience some
benefits in living and is not going to die soon anyway.91
But the case of people in a permanent vegetative state is decidedly
different-these knotty problems are avoided because such people
have no discernible interest in continued living that is improperly
overcome by judgments about the quality of their lives or that might
be improperly trumped by their pre-disability sentiments.
Finally, while I claim that people in a permanent vegetative state
have no interest in continued living, I am not trying to make the claim
that they have no interests at all. Philosophers have argued over this
point without reaching any clear consensus, except with regard to
such individuals' lack of experiential interests. I have already stated
that the person might be understood as having interests that her pre-
vegetative-state autonomy be respected. I have suggested that we
should avoid considering these as "present interests," however, and
are severely disabled but not permanently vegetative). See also In re Wendland, 28
P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001) (finding that the surrogate decision-maker had failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the severely brain damaged but conscious patient
wished to refuse life-sustaining treatment or that to withhold such treatment would
have been in his best interest); In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 491-92 (Wis. 1997)
("a guardian [of a ward] may only direct the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical
treatment, including nutrition and hydration, if incompetent ward is in a persistent
vegetative state and the decision to withdraw is in the best interests of the ward"); In
re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (involving a patient who might now be consid-
ered "minimally conscious," the court would not allow removal of artificial nutrition
and hydration unless there were one of the following: clear evidence of prior instruc-
tions of the patient; some evidence of patient preferences plus burdens to continued
treatment; or in the absence of either instructions or evidence of preferences, evidence
of unavoidable pain). In Wendland, the court noted, "It is ... worth mentioning that
no decision of which we are aware has approved a conservator's or guardian's pro-
posal to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from a conscious conservatee or
ward." Id. at 170. Note also that statutes that immunize participants in treatment with-
drawal decisions often limit that immunity to those situations in which the patient is
in a terminal condition or permanently vegetative. See ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L.
CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 8.03
(3rd ed. 2004). For a discussion of Conroy and its requirement of pain for a successful
benefits/burdens test on treatment withdrawal, see Norman L. Cantor, Discarding
Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward a Constructive Preference Standard
for Dying, Previously Competent Patients without Advance Directives, 48 RUTGERS L.
REv. 1193 (1996); JENNETr, supra note 16, at 192-94.
91 See generally Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life
and Non- Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox
Approach, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 234 (1989); and Dresser, supra note 75, at
376-79.
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recognize them instead as preferences of the past that we may well
want or need to respect.
The patient may also be said to have interests in her bodily integ-
rity and in her privacy-for example, in being kept clean and in being
protected from public display. My proposal for reform, however, does
not rest upon my justifying that these are "interests" in any proper
philosophical sense, or interests that she has a right, constitutional or
otherwise, to enforce. Rather, my focus is on the responsibility of
other individuals and of society, sometimes in the form of the state, to
give her these things-these things which are a part of at least the
barest minimum respect we owe a person.
III. HOW THE LAW FAILS PEOPLE IN A PERMANENT
VEGETATIVE STATE
Our law fails people in a permanent vegetative state by allowing
them to be perpetually fed in service to the interests of others. Even
when they would have preferred to have their tube feeding discontin-
ued and be allowed to die, the law does not ensure or even make
probable that those preferences will be honored. How is this so?
A combination of factors are at work here, including our reliance
on surrogate (usually family) decision-making, the lack of judicial
review for decisions to continue treatment, and most of all, the pre-
sumption in favor of life-sustaining treatments, including artificial
nutrition and hydration. What follows is a review of the law in general
in this area and Florida law in particular, as applied to the case of
Terri Schiavo.
As will become evident, the law generally, in Florida and else-
where, not only allows patient preferences to discontinue feeding to
be routinely ignored, but it never adequately acknowledges or ad-
dresses the ethical problem of imposing invasive tube feeding upon
people who cannot benefit from it. The ethics of discontinuing feeding
have been examined, but the ethics offorce feeding rarely so.
A. The Law Generally Applicable to People in a Permanent
Vegetative State
The legal architecture of end-of-life decision-making has been
constructed over the last thirty years by numerous court opinions and,
more recently, by statutes adopted by state legislatures, most of which
follow guidelines previously set out in judicial opinions.92 While the
92 For a brief summary of state statutes and case law regarding surrogate
decision-making, see JANET L. DOLG1N & LOIs SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW
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law in this area is complex, in the main there are two overriding
considerations-the patient's self-determination and the patient's
interests, with primary weight placed upon respecting the patient's
right to self-determination. This emphasis is justified because the right
to refuse medical treatment is based in the liberty interests or
autonomy rights of the individual patient, and thus, to the extent we
can determine what she would want done, the law generally gives
effect to that preference. Sometimes, however, we cannot determine
what an individual would wish (for example, if she never was
competent, or if we simply lack evidence of her wishes), and in such
cases courts have sometimes allowed a weighing of the burdens and
benefits of a proposed course of treatment, which courts term a "best
interests" analysis.
This general structure of end-of-life law currently applies to peo-
ple in a permanent vegetative state. The 1976 New Jersey Supreme
Court case of Karen Ann Quinlan, the first so-called "right to die"
case, involved a request by Karen's father to remove her from a venti-
lator.93 Karen was in permanent vegetative state.94 Her father was al-
lowed to "substitute" his judgment for his daughter's and he had the
ventilator removed.95 Following the ventilator's removal, Karen lived
many more years with the assistance of a nasogastric feeding tube.
96
In the early days of "right to die" cases, tube feeding was not consid-
ered extraordinary medical treatment that might properly be fore-
gone.97 That view eventually changed and there is now a general
medical and legal consensus that "artificial nutrition and hydration" is
a form of medical treatment that can be withdrawn under certain cir-
cumstances. 98 What these circumstances might be was the subject of
the 1990 Supreme Court case, In re Cruzan, in which the parents of
another woman in a permanent vegetative state (Nancy Beth Cruzan)
sought removal of her feeding tube a request which the Missouri Su-
743-49 (2005). For a more comprehensive explanation of the law of end-of-life deci-
sion-making, see generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 90.
93 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom,. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
94 Id. at 654.
9' Id. at 666.
96 Annette E. Clark, The Right to Die: The Broken Road from Quinlan to
Schiavo, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 385, 393 (citation omitted).
97 See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 90, at § 6.03[G][3] & § 5.02[E]. See
also WILLIAM COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN 21-22 (2002)
(recounting the Cruzan family's struggle to have Nancy Cruzan's feeding tube re-
moved during the 1980s).
98 Casarett et al., supra note 1, at 2607.
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preme Court had denied.99 The United States Supreme Court upheld
Missouri's prohibition against removing artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion unless there was clear and convincing evidence that this was what
Nancy Cruzan would have wanted, based on her own statements to
that effect.
Both before and following the Cruzan case, other jurisdictions
have considered the right of the person in a permanent vegetative state
to refuse treatment. This issue has been considered both in court, in
response to particular cases, and also by end-of-life statutes, applying
more generally and prospectively.00 A number of courts have de-
clared that the state's interests in continuing "mere biological exis-
tence" and even the individual patient's own interest in or right to life
can be properly subordinated to the patient's right to refuse treat-
ment.10 1 They have allowed surrogates to withdraw feeding tubes on
the basis of this right when there is sufficient evidence that the patient
would have wanted feeding withdrawn.
10 2
When a patient's preferences regarding discontinuing treatment
have not been clear, courts have sometimes become mired in argu-
ments about the best interests of the permanently vegetative patient.
For while there is no benefit to the patient in continued living, there is
also no burden experienced by the patient. 10 3 If a best interests analy-
sis requires that benefits must outweigh burdens in order to justify the
withdrawal of treatment (as a number of courts have held),1°4 then
99 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 268 (1990).
100 See cases cited supra notes 101-06. See generally John A. Robertson,
Schiavo andIts (In)Significance, 35 STETSON L. REv. 101, 102-04 (summarizing legal
developments since Quinlan); Cantor, supra note 90, at 1193 (summarizing standards
for decision-making).
101 See Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 88 (1983)); In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. 1996) ("The state's inter-
est in maintaining the PVS individual in an endless twilight state between life and
death is so weak that it cannot overcome the individual's right to self-determination.")
(citation omitted).
102 See, e.g., In re Fiori, 673 A.2d at 910. See infra note 133 and accompany-
ing text regarding differences among jurisdictions regarding the adequacy and weight
of various kinds of evidence. Many state statutes also now expressly permit surrogate
decision-makers to withdraw feeding tubes from such patients if to do so would be
consistent with patient preferences. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 90.
103 See, e.g., Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 759 (Md. 1993).
104 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992) ("pre-
sumption is that continued life is in best interests of patient, and burden rests upon
guardian to show.., that decision to withhold or withdraw treatment was in patient's
best interests and was made in good faith"); In re Peter by Johanning, 529 A.2d 419
(N.J. 1987) (discussing benefits/burdens calculation of best interests test).
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perpetual feeding of the permanently vegetative patient would seem
required. Some courts have avoided this difficulty in applying the best
interests test by adopting the standard, but then deferring to surrogates
to determine what is in the best interests of the patient.10 5 (Some of
these courts, while deferring to surrogates on this question, note that
the permanently vegetative person may be burdened by the indignity
of the condition.) 0 6 Adopting a best interests standard but then defer-
ring to surrogates as to what counts as burdens and benefits is unsatis-
factory when the patient is in a permanent vegetative state. First, it
ignores the fact that all people in a permanent vegetative state are
identical in regards to their present and future interests-and thus no
individualized best interests analysis is required.'0 7 Second, because
the test is essentially without any objective content, it allows the sur-
rogate (usually a family member) to consider his or her own interests
105 See Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2004) (holding that
life support can be withdrawn from never competent patient in a permanent vegetative
state only upon surrogate's decision, made upon the basis of clear and convincing
evidence that withdrawing life support is in the patient's best interest-but requiring
no judicial review of such decisions); Guardianship of L. W, 482 N.W.2d at 60
(guardian must decide whether in vegetative patient's best interest to have life-
sustaining treatment withdrawn); Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674
(Ariz. 1987) (allowing public fiduciary as guardian to reject medical treatment for
patient in a persistent vegetative state under best interests standard); In re Guardian-
ship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (approving parents' decision
to remove life-support systems from permanently comatose ten-month-old son).
106 See In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. App. 1992); Guardianship of
L. W., 482 N.W.2d at 60.
107 This point is recognized in one author's critique of a 1994 English case
involving a permanently vegetative patient whose wife and mother disagreed regard-
ing the termination of artificial nutrition and hydration. The judge held in that case, In
re G, [1995] 2 FCR 46, that the doctor, in reaching a decision to discontinue feeding
because it was not in the patient's best interests, was required to have taken account
of relatives' views. Andrew Grubb writes:
What can the relatives tell the doctor that is relevant to his 'best interests'
determination? It is not clear to me what, as a matter of generality, that
could be: (1) the patient's views of his own destiny? (but that seems to be
irrelevant in English law except where it amounts to an advance refusal of
treatment; English law does not (as yet) adopt the American-born notion of
'substituted judgment'); (2) their own views of the patient's 'best interests'?
(how is this relevant so as to convert what must otherwise be 'futile' treat-
ment into something else?); or (3) their views on what should be done be-
cause of the effects upon them: they wish to continue to care for him; they
would like to let him go and mourn his death (again, how can the relatives'
interests be relevant under a legal test which focuses exclusively on the pa-
tient's interests?).
Andrew Grubb, The Persistent Vegetative State: A Duty (Not) to Treat & Conscien-
tious Objection, in THE VEGETATIVE STATE: PERSISTING PROBLEMS IN LAW &
REGULATION 12, 18 (Pat Walsh, ed. 1999) (citations omitted).
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and the interests of other family members in making the decision-all
in the name of the patient's rights.
Alternatively, some courts have determined that the best interests
analysis is inapplicable to patients in a permanent vegetative state
because it is impossible to determine any benefits or burdens to them
of continued treatment.10 8 To engage in such a calculation would al-
low, indeed appear to require, quality-of-life judgments that courts are
reluctant to permit.109 Accordingly, these courts have held that treat-
ment can never be withdrawn from a person in a permanent vegetative
state unless that decision is made in accordance with her wishes.' l
0
A better approach would be to reformulate how we understand the
best interests approach as applied to the permanently vegetative per-
son. As Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock have explained, "The proper
question for such patients ... is not 'Would withdrawal of life support
best serve the patient's interest?' but rather 'Would continued support
provide any benefit? '''I We lose something if we do not focus on the
lack of benefit to the patient--or rather, on her lack of interest in con-
tinuing to live. We lose sight of the fact that somebody's interests are
driving this train, and if not the patient's, then whose?
B. Florida Law
While courts' attempts to apply a best interests analysis to people
in a permanent vegetative state have been unsatisfactory, their impulse
to reach for this familiar standard, generally applicable to medical
treatment decisions for incompetent patients, is understandable. There
is an obvious temptation to place the permanently vegetative individ-
ual in known and familiar categories, treating them like other persons
who seem somewhat similar, and therefore drawing upon a ready-
108 See, e.g., Mack, 618 A.2d at 759 ("A best interest test applied to Ronald or
to any patient who is in a persistent vegetative state, who is not in pain, and who is
not terminally ill, requires this Court to make a quality-of-life judgment under judi-
cially adopted standards, without legislative guidelines."); DeGrella By and Through
Parrent v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 708-10 (Ky. 1993) (stating that best interests
analysis would not be adopted); Peter by Johanning, 529 A.2d at 425 ("a benefits-
burden analysis . . . is essentially impossible with patients in a persistent vegetative
state"). See also 73 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 162 (1988) ("The balancing of costs and
benefits to the patient that a surrogate must undertake for a terminally ill patient can-
not be done in the same way for a patient who is permanently unconscious.").
109 See Mack, 618 A.2d at 759.
110 See cases cited supra note 108.
111 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 75, at 132 (emphasis added). See also
Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 679 (approving surrogate's decision to place "do not resusci-
tate" and "do not hospitalize" orders for patient in a persistent vegetative state be-
cause of lack of benefit to her).
[Vol. 16:631
IN RESPECT OF PEOPLE
made set of rules to govem our treatment of them. But those rules do
not fit.
This becomes even more apparent when we look with some detail
at the way Florida law provides for people in a permanent vegetative
state, which essentially treats them like the incompetent terminally
ill.112 The statutes that govern treatment withdrawal decisions require
first a determination of what the now incompetent person would want.
If there is a living will-a written document executed by the individ-
ual, while competent, that addresses what should be done in the situa-
tion that now exists-then the instructions of that living will may be
followed. 13 Typically, however, there is no living will, or its applica-
bility to the present situation is indeterminate. 14 The law then looks to
an individual appointed by the patient to be his or her health care sur-
rogate, or in the absence of such designation (again, a typical occur-
rence), the patient's family. 1" Family members are selected according
to a prioritized list according to the relationship with the patient, with
spouse coming before parent. 16 This individual, called the "proxy"
under Florida law, is then authorized to make treatment decisions for
the patient, including in certain circumstances, a decision to withhold
or withdraw treatment.' '7 Decisions of the latter sort, however, are
narrowly circumscribed. "Life-prolonging procedures" (which in-
cludes artificial nutrition and hydration) 1 8 may only be withheld or
112 Chapter 765 of the Florida Statutes contains the procedures for removing
life-prolonging treatment from persons who have become incapacitated. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 765 (West 2005).
113 § 765.302(3) (living will creates a rebuttable presumption of patient's
wishes); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 17 (Fla. 1990) (same).
114 The percentage of adults in the United States completing advance direc-
tives (which include both living wills and durable powers of attorney for health care),
range from 15-20 percent. Muriel R. Gillick, Advance Care Planning, 350 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 7, 8 (2004). For a recent and thorough critique of living wills, see Angela
Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 30 (2004).
115 Meisel & Cerminara explain that most states have adopted surrogate deci-
sion-making statutes for the purpose of making clear
what is at least implicit in the case law: that the customary medical profes-
sional practice of using family members to make decisions for patients who
lack decisionmaking capacity and who lack advance directives is legally
valid, and that ordinarily judicial proceedings need not be initiated for the
appointment of a guardian.
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 90, at § 8.01.
116 § 765.401.
117 § 765.401(3).
118 "Life-prolonging procedure" means, under the Florida statute, "any medi-
cal procedure, treatment, or intervention, including artificially provided sustenance
and hydration, which sustains, restores, or supplants a spontaneous vital function." §
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withdrawn if the patient is in one of three conditions:"19 a terminal
condition, 120  an end-stage condition (such as advanced Alz-
heimer's), 121 or a persistent vegetative state. 122 The existence of the
condition must be verified by two physicians. 123 Further, life-
sustaining treatment may only be withdrawn if the surrogate deter-
mines on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that withdrawing
treatment is in accordance with the patient's wishes or, if there is in-
sufficient evidence of the patient's wishes, if withdrawing treatment is
in the patient's best interests. 124 The "clear and convincing" standard
765.101(10). Excluded from the definition is "the administration of medication or
performance of medical procedure, when such medication or procedure is deemed
necessary to provide comfort care or to alleviate pain." § 765.101(10).
119 It is important to note that both the Florida statutes, § 765.106, and the
Florida Supreme Court in In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 11 (Fla.
1990), indicate that individuals may have a common law or constitutional right to
refuse treatment that is greater than what is set out in the statutory scheme. Therefore,
it is possible that an individual can have life-prolonging procedures withdrawn even
though he or she does not fall into one of these three categories. In In re Browning,
the court approved a surrogate's decision to withdraw a feeding tube from a woman
whose death was not "imminent" and who was not in a permanent vegetative state
(the two conditions at that time included in the Florida statutes for which a surrogate
could withdraw life-prolonging treatment). Id. at 17.
120 A "terminal condition" means "a condition caused by injury, disease, or
illness from which there is no reasonable medical probability of recovery and which,
without treatment, can be expected to cause death." § 765.101(17).
121 An "end stage condition" is "an irreversible condition that is caused by
injury, disease, or illness which has resulted in progressively severe and permanent
deterioration, and which, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, treatment of
the condition would be ineffective." § 765.101(4). This term is commonly understood
to embrace advanced dementia, such as that caused by Alzheimer's, which is steadily
progressive, incurable and ultimately fatal. See Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 00-029 (2000)
(interpreting a statute similar to Florida's).
122 The Florida statutes define "persistent vegetative state" as "a permanent
and irreversible condition of unconsciousness in which there is: (a) The absence of
voluntary action or cognitive behavior of any kind. (b) An inability to communicate
or interact purposefully with the environment." § 765.101(12).
123 § 765.306.
124 This standard is clearly delineated with respect to surrogates who are
designated by statute rather than appointed by the patient through an advance direc-
tive. § 765.401(3). Under Florida law, such a surrogate is called a "proxy." See §
765.401. The statutes do not specifically require this evidentiary standard with respect
to a surrogate appointed by an advance directive. See § 765.205 for a description of
the responsibilities of the appointed surrogate. The statute provides that health care
decisions must be made as the surrogate
believes the principal would have made [them] under the circumstances if
the principal were capable of making such decisions. If there is no indica-
tion of what the principal would have chosen, the surrogate may consider
the patient's best interest in deciding that proposed treatments are to be
withheld or that treatments currently in effect are to be withdrawn.
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of evidence lies between the usual standard of evidence in a civil case,
that of preponderance of the evidence, and the usual standard in a
criminal case, that of beyond a reasonable doubt. 25 Judicial approval
of a surrogate's decision to withdraw treatment is not required, 26 but
immunity for those involved in the decision to withdraw treatment
depends upon the surrogate's compliance with the statute. 2 7 Health-
care providers may therefore refuse to withdraw treatment on the basis
of a surrogate's instructions unless the surrogate's decision is judi-
cially sanctioned. Other family members or other interested parties
may also challenge a surrogate's decision to withdraw treatment by
instituting a judicial proceeding to put the surrogate to his proof. 128
Florida's law on end-of-life decision-making is in many respects
more liberal than the law of other states. For example, Florida statutes
make clear that artificial nutrition and hydration is a form of medical
treatment that may be withheld or withdrawn under the same condi-
tions as other forms of medical treatment, 129 whereas some states
make it more difficult for the surrogate to withhold or withdraw artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration than other forms of treatment.13° Florida
§ 765.205. The surrogate is given explicit authority to consent to withholding or
withdrawing life-prolonging procedures as long as the patient is in one of the three
conditions described above. § 765.305. This decision can be challenged by the pa-
tient's family, or some other interested party, if"[t]he surrogate or proxy's decision is
not in accord with the patient's known desires or the provisions of this chapter."
§765.105. The Florida Supreme Court's opinion in In re Guardianship of Browning
suggests that the "clear and convincing" standard would apply equally to surrogate
and proxy decisions to withdraw life-prolonging treatment, although this is not en-
tirely clear. 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990).
125 The majority opinion in Cruzan noted that clear and convincing evidence
was that which
produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the
truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct
and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285 n. 11 (1990) (citations omit-
ted).
126 Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14-15.
127 See § 765.109.
128 See § 765.105.
129 See § 765.101 (including "artificially provided sustenance and hydration"
in the definition of "life-prolonging procedures" that may be withheld or withdrawn
in certain instances).
130 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.03(2)(b)(2), 145B.13(2) (West 2005)
(discussing requirements for creating a living will and that food and hydration must
be administered unless the patient clearly documents otherwise); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, §§ 3080.4(A)(1), 3101.4(B) (West 2004) (describing the presumption of nutri-
tion and hydration and providing a sample format for an advance directive). See gen-
erally Alan Meisel, Barriers to Foregoing Nutrition and Hydration in Nursing
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has added "end-stage condition" to its list of conditions in which life-
sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn, whereas other
states limit treatment withdrawals to the terminally ill or those in a
permanent vegetative state. 13 In the Florida courts, judges have al-
lowed evidence of the patient's values and personality in determining
whether the surrogate is making the decision that the patient would
make, 32 whereas some other states have imposed far more stringent
requirements with regard to the type of evidence that may be used to
support the surrogate's decision-some insisting, for example, on
statements made by the patient about the particular condition in which
she now finds herself, or about the particular sort of treatment (e.g.,
ventilator, feeding tube) that might be withdrawn. 133 Finally, Florida
also allows a surrogate decision-maker to withhold or withdraw
treatment even in the absence of evidence that it is what the patient
would want, if the surrogate has clear and convincing evidence that
nontreatment would be in the patient's best interests-for example, if
treatment would prolong the patient's life, but only with significant
pain or other burdens. 34 Many other states explicitly eschew such a
best interest analysis on the grounds that it would permit a surrogate
Homes, 21 AM. J. L. & MED. 335 (1995) (discussing the greater reluctance by medical
professionals to remove hydration and feeding tubes than to cease other types of life-
sustainin treatment).
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 90, at § 8.03. See, e.g., MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-9-106(1) (2005) ("terminal condition"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a)
(2006) (terminal and incurable condition or persistent vegetative state).
132 See In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo II), 792 So. 2d 551, 560 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("the trial judge . . . properly considered evidence of Mrs.
Schiavo's values, personality, and her own decision-making process.").
133 There are intermediate positions between these, each court adopting its
own view of the adequacy and weight of various kinds of evidence. For example,
some states have required evidence that the patient had actual views on the subject
prior to incompetency, rather than allowing the surrogate to take account of all rele-
vant knowledge of the patient's life, values, and personality, in addition to statements
made by the patient, in order to determine what the patient would choose now, if he or
should could form and communicate a choice. See, e.g., Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d
744, 758 (Md. 1993). That Florida adopts the latter view of what some courts have
called "substituted judgment," is evident in the Florida appellate court's affirmance of
the guardianship court's ruling that "clear and convincing evidence at the time of trial
supported a determination that Mrs. Schiavo would have chosen in February 2000 to
withdraw the life-prolonging procedures." In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo
III), 800 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). For an explanation of the differ-
ent approaches that have emerged with respect to substituted judgment in this context,
see Cantor, supra note 90, at 1193.
134 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.205(b) (West 2005) (for surrogates appointed
by advance directive); § 765.401 (for surrogates called "proxies," designated by stat-
ute).
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to engage in unacceptable evaluations of the "quality of life" of the
patient. 135
But Florida, like the law of most states, still retains a presumption
in favor of continued treatment. In In re Browning, a Florida appeals
court stated, "In making this difficult decision, a surrogate decision-
maker should err on the side of life .... In cases of doubt, we must
assume that a patient would choose to defend life in exercising his or
her right to privacy."' 136 This statement was quoted with approval by
the Second District Court of Appeals in upholding the initial decision
of the trial court to remove Terri Schiavo's feeding tube.
137
The presumption is also embedded in the statutory system for
end-of-life decision-making in the requirement that life-sustaining
treatment be withheld or withdrawn only upon clear and convincing
evidence that the decision is according to the patient's preferences or
her interests. 138 In the absence of evidence reaching this standard
(even in the presence of a preponderance of the evidence that the pa-
tient would want treatment withdrawn), treatment may not be with-
drawn. Moreover, if the surrogate prefers treatment for the patient,
rather than wishes to withdraw it, there is no obvious procedure or
clear standards by which to challenge that decision as contrary to the
patient's preferences. The exception may be if the patient had left a
very specific living will that the surrogate appeared to disregard.
139
135 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988); In re Storar,
420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981); MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 90, at § 4.07[B]; and
Cathaleen A. Roach, Paradox and Pandora's Box: The Tragedy of Current Right-to-
Die Jurisprudence, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 133 (1991) (arguing for uniformity
among state laws).
136 In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
(recognizing state constitutional rights to refuse medical treatment on behalf of in-
competent patients).
137 In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo I), 780 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.32001) ("We reconfirm today that a court's default position must favor life.").
8 MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 90, at § 3.27[A] ("'Clear and convinc-
ing evidence' has become the clearly dominant accepted standard of proof in end-of-
life cases. Clearly, it applies in court cases; it similarly appears that this standard of
proof is to be used in nonjudicial review of end-of-life decisionmaking.").
139 This appeared to be the situation in another recent, highly unusual Florida
case, involving a man named Hanford Pinette. In the fall of 2004, the doctors of Mr.
Pinette, a seventy-three-year-old man, certified that he was in a terminal condition.
He was suffering from chronic failure of his respiratory, circulatory and renal sys-
tems. In 1998 he had signed a living will that, according to news reports, directed that
life-sustaining treatment be withheld in these circumstances. He had also executed a
health care power of attorney, naming his wife of many years as his health care surro-
gate. She disagreed with the doctors about the state of her husband's condition and
the application of his living will, saying that he still enjoyed watching sports on tele-
vision with other family members and that he was responsive. She insisted that he
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But otherwise, surrogate decisions in favor of treatment are likely to
go unchallenged unless they are causing the patient unreasonable pain
or other burdens, in which case health care providers or other family
members may attempt to intervene. With respect to the patient in a
permanent vegetative state, there would be no unreasonable pain or
burdens that would be experienced by the patient, and so the grounds
for intervening and challenging the surrogate's decision are essentially
absent.
Thus, tube feeding for the person in a permanent vegetative state
may be discontinued in certain circumstances, but it will depend upon
who the surrogate decision-maker is whether feeding will continue or
not. The surrogate who decides against feeding can have a difficult
time making the case for removal of the feeding tube. Michael
Schiavo is one such surrogate who ultimately received court orders to
permit feeding to be discontinued, but only after a long and bitter bat-
tle, during which Terri Schiavo became both the pawn and the end-
game.
More importantly, however, the battle would never have been
fought, a decision to discontinue feeding would never have been
made, and Terri would likely continue to live for a few more decades,
against her wishes and solely because of others' interests and ideolo-
gies, if Michael Schiavo had been replaced with Robert or Mary
Schindler. 140 Under Florida law (and again, most state laws) their de-
cision to continue to tube feed Terri would most likely not have come
under judicial review. In theory, Michael Schiavo could have chal-
lenged the decision to continue to tube feed Terri, but there would be
no clear basis for that challenge. Surrogates making decisions to with-
would not yet want to die. Hospital administrators petitioned a circuit court to enforce
the living will over the wife's objection, which it did. See Mike Branom, Judge Up-
holds Living Will, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 24, 2004, at B6; Anthony Cola-
rossi & Melissa Harris, Living- Will Questions Persist: A Lake Case Causes Some to
Wonder if Their Wishes Will Be Followed, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 25, 2004, at B1.
For commentary questioning the appropriateness of the court's decision, see Lois
Shepherd, Shattering the Neutral Surrogate Myth in End-of-Life Decisionmaking:
Terri Schiavo and Her Family, 35 CuMB. L. REV 575 (2005).
140 Either Michael or one of Terri's parents could have qualified as the surro-
gate for Terri, but Michael had priority as her spouse. The surrogate decision-making
statute in Florida provides for the following people to serve as surrogate (called the
"proxy"), in the priority listed: (a) a guardian appointed by a court (although the stat-
ute made clear that one did not need to be appointed); (b) the patient's spouse; (c) an
adult child of the patient (or a majority of adult children reasonably available for
consultation if there is more than one adult child); (d) a parent of the patient; (e) the
adult sibling of the patient (or a majority of the adult siblings reasonably available for
consultation if there is more than one adult sibling); (e) an adult relative of the pa-
tient; or (f) a close friend of the patient. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401 (West 2005).
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draw treatment can be put to their proof, but decisions to continue
unburdensome treatment are presumptively valid, even preferred.
The result is that surrogates' interests in continuing to feed the in-
dividual in a permanent vegetative state prevail under Florida's and
most states' existing statutory scheme regarding the cessation of life-
sustaining treatment. These laws unreasonably place into the hands of
others the power to continue feeding patients in a permanent vegeta-
tive state when it is not for their benefit, nor even according to their
wishes, to be fed.
Why do we give surrogates so much power? The family's role in
end-of-life decision-making is generally justified on the grounds that
family members are the persons most likely to know what a patient's
preferences would be regarding treatment or nontreatment and that
family members most likely will, through natural bonds of affection,
act to protect the patient's interests. 141 The fact that most patients
appear to want a family member, rather than a physician or court or
other stranger, to make such decisions for them lends further support
to family participation in end-of-life decision-making. 42 We might
also justify family involvement in part on the grounds that close
family members have interests of their own that might well deserve
protection, as long as those interests do not take precedence over the
patient's interests. 43 Family members may need involvement in the
decision-making as part of their role of caring for the patient; they
may need some delay in a decision to withdraw treatment; they likely
141 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED.
& BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 126-28
(1983).
142 See Stephen C. Hines et al., Dialysis Patients' Preferences for Family-
Based Advance Care Planning, 130 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 825, 825 (1999) (ex-
plaining that studies have shown that "patients do not trust their physicians to honor
their wishes. Instead, they trust their families and prefer that their families speak for
them"); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 446, n.l 1 (N.J. 1987) (reporting on surveys);
Dallas M. High, All in the Family: Extended Autonomy and Expectations in Surrogate
Health Care Decision-Making, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 46 (1988).
143 See generally Shepherd, supra note 139 (arguing for some deference to
family member surrogate preferences in the case of terminally ill patients, as long as
decisions are not clearly against the patient's interests or known preferences); and
Kathleen M. Boozang, An Intimate Passing: Restoring the Role of Family and Relig-
ion in Dying, 58 U. Pri. L. REv. 549 (1997) (arguing for legal changes to respect the
family's interests in end-of-life decisions). Professor Boozang's proposal calls for
deference to family decision-making without the restraints of a "substituted judg-
ment" or "best interest" rubric and with particular respect for the family's religious
beliefs. Id. at 552-54. See also Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102
HARv. L. REv. 375 (1988) (proposing legal presumption in favor of the choice of a
close family member).
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need conversation with health care providers that involves a sharing of
information about the patient and her welfare.
In the case of the patient who is likely to die shortly from the
natural progression of his disease process, deference to a family
member's decision to continue treatment may be warranted as long as
treatment does not cause the patient to suffer and is not clearly con-
trary to his known preferences. Our law's deference to family mem-
bers may also mean, however, that sometimes family members may
continue treatment when it is against the patient's known preferences
or interests. Still, we may prefer a system, such as the one we have, in
which we do not provide judicial oversight of such decisions because,
on the whole, family member surrogates do put the patient first, ahead
of their own considerations; because imposing judicial or similar scru-
tiny would cause added suffering to the family; or because we believe
that health care providers can generally provide a check against the
provision of treatment that would actually burden rather than benefit
the patient. For the incompetent, terminally ill patient, this may be the
appropriate method of making treatment decisions. 144 In such cases,
the primary effect of treatment will be to cause a delay in the inevita-
ble death of the patient. But this system for end-of-life decision-
making for the terminally ill has far different consequences when ap-
plied to people in a permanent vegetative state.
If the "correct" treatment decision could be determined objec-
tively-where the evidence of patient preferences was clear or the
interests of the patient clearly pointed to some treatment decision over
another-then "incorrect" treatment decisions (that is, decisions to
treat, when nontreatment is preferable and vice versa) are, in the case
of the terminally ill patient, at least in some respects limited by the
limited life span of the patient who must bear the consequences of that
decision. There may be unnecessary pain and suffering caused by the
surrogate's mistaken judgment, or a patient may live his last days in a
debilitating state that he had wished to avoid. But the presumption in
favor of continuing treatment does not have the long-term conse-
quences that it does for the person in a permanent vegetative state. If
the surrogate has allowed his or her own interests (or the interests of
others) to dictate the continued treatment of the patient, such instru-
mental use of the patient will, for the dying patient, be short-lived,
whereas for the patient in a permanent vegetative state, such instru-
mental use could be potentially decades-long.
The law in Florida gives at least some limited recognition to the
unfortunate state of limbo into which the permanently vegetative pa-
l44 See generally Shepherd, supra note 139.
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tient may fall. It permits the withdrawal of feeding and hydration for
patients who do not have a living will and have no family member or
other personal surrogate to speak for them.1 45 In such cases, a social
worker can, in conference with a hospital or nursing home ethics
committee, authorize the withdrawal of feeding if they agree that such
is in the patient's best interests. 46 This exception is for permanently
vegetative patients only.1 47 The exception appears to suggest at least
two things: first, that assessing the appropriateness of continued feed-
ing of the vegetative patient might be achieved by objective measures,
applicable to all such patients rather than requiring an individualized
analysis; and two, that the operation of such objective measures could
quite understandably lead to discontinuation of feeding. Under this
exception, if Terri Schiavo had not had a family member or close
friend willing to serve as her surrogate, her feeding tube could have be
discontinued upon the decision of a social worker at the institution in
which she was cared for, upon the agreement of its ethics committee.
This exception is a step in the right direction,148 in that it recog-
nizes that patients in a permanent vegetative state are not like dying
patients: an early decision to treat, left unchecked, may lead to perpet-
ual feeding of patients in a permanent vegetative state when it does
not benefit them.
IV. THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS
If continued tube feeding of people in a permanent vegetative
state is not done to satisfy their preferences, or to benefit them, what
sorts of other interests are driving the decision for continued treat-
ment? Here the case of Terri Schiavo is again instructive. 49
That other people used Terri Schiavo for their own purposes, or
sometimes, as we will see, were just accused of doing so, makes clear
that under current law, others' interests can and sometimes do im-
properly influence the decision to continue feeding patients in a per-
manent vegetative state. These interests may be financial, ideological,
or personal.
141 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.404 (West 2005).
146 § 765.404.
147 § 765.404.
148 It is not obviously, in my view, the best approach, as it still appears to
allow a social worker and ethics committee to determine that continued feeding is in
the permanently vegetative patient's best interests. Moreover, it only applies when no
family member or close friend will serve as surrogate, a limited group of people.
149 For a concise summary of the facts in the Schiavo controversy, see Lois
Shepherd, Terri Schiavo: Unsettling the Settled, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 297 (2006).
20061
HEAL TH MATRIX
A. Financial Interests
During the battle over Terri Schiavo's feeding tube, the
Schindlers accused Michael Schiavo of having a financial interest in
discontinuing feeding, while Michael Schiavo countered that the
Schindlers had a financial interest in keeping Terri Schiavo alive. The
arguments, on both sides, looked like this.
Michael Schiavo, in 1993, successfully sued certain health care
providers involved in Terri's care for failing to diagnose her as bu-
limic.' 50 According to the allegations in the lawsuit, Terri's bulimia
caused a potassium imbalance in her body that brought on a cardiac
arrest, which led to her brain being deprived of oxygen and her ulti-
mate permanent vegetative state.' 5 ' Part of the award in that case,
$750,000, was for Terri's continued care.' 52 According to a guardian
ad litem's report, this money was placed in a trust fund, which was
managed by an independent trustee and over which Michael Schiavo
had no control. 153 But the Schindlers argued that if Terri died, those
remaining monies would become part of Terri's estate, which Michael
Schiavo would inherit. 54 Thus, one of their arguments for removing
Michael Schiavo as the guardian of Terri Schiavo was that he was
motivated not to protect her interests, but to further his own, by has-
tening Terri's death, saving what was left from the judgment for her
care, and securing it for himself.155 The governor of Florida, as part of
his justification for intervening in the Schiavo case, also made public
reference to Michael Schiavo's financial interests in Terri's death. 156
The Florida Court of Appeals, when confronted early on with this
argument, countered in two ways. First, the Court noted that surro-
gates will generally have financial interests that are bound up with the
decision to continue or discontinue feeding-the people who are ei-
150 WOLFSON, supra note 13, at 8-9.
151 Id.
152 The Wolfson Report places the figure at $750,000 for economic damages,
while the original court order in the Schiavo case places the figure at $700,000. Id; In
re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Feb. 11, 2000) (order authorizing removal of Terri Schiavo's feeding tube).
153 WOLFSON, supra note 13, at 9.
154 In re Guardianship of Schiavo (Schiavo I), 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2001).
155 Id.
156 See On the Record with Greta Van Susteren: Is a Florida Judge About to
Throw Out a Law Keeping Terri Schiavo Alive? (Fox News television broadcast Jan.
9, 2004), transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,108134,00.
html (Ken Connor, attorney for Governor Jeb Bush, stating, "The testimony that's
been offered by the husband, who has a stake in her death and who stands to gain
financially and otherwise by her death, is uncorroborated.").
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ther designated as surrogates by the patient, or who are designated by
statute, are often people who stand to inherit a portion of the estate of
the patient. 5 7 Second, the Schindlers could also be understood as hav-
ing a financial interest in the decision whether to continue to feed
Terri. If they were able, through legal maneuvering, to keep Terri
alive long enough so that Michael Schiavo would seek a divorce in
order to continue his own life with perhaps a new wife, then they
would stand to inherit from Terri's estate. They would, accordingly,
have a financial interest in keeping her alive until Michael Schiavo
divorced her, and then authorize the withdrawal of the feeding tube.1
58
It is important to note that while the trial and appellate courts ac-
knowledged that Michael Schiavo might have financial interests in
Terri's death, and the Schindlers in Terri's life, they did not ascribe
such motives to either side. 59 In fact, in an early filing with the court,
Michael Schiavo noted that he had formally offered to divest himself
of any financial interest in Terri's estate.' 60 By the time the feeding
tube was removed in March of 2005, there was very little, if any,
money left. 161
But the argument about such financial interests is important be-
cause, whether or not such interests motivated the parties in the
Schiavo case, they clearly can motivate the parties in other cases.
Medical malpractice judgments or settlements associated with the
continued care of a person in a permanent vegetative state should not
be structured in a way that can influence the decision of whether or
not to continue feeding such a person. More specifically, any savings
that are made because of a decision to discontinue feeding should not
devolve to the person who makes that decision.
Perhaps it is not possible to eliminate entirely the financial inter-
ests of others in the future treatment of the patient, but now that it has
become clear that they can play a role-and it is difficult to find any
proper aspect to that role-then the law should be modified to reduce
these influences.
157 Schiavo I, 780 So. 2d at 178.
158 See id.
159 Id.
160 WOLFSON, supra note 13, at 12. The Gaurdian Ad Litem's report explains
that Michael Schiavo described this formal offer in a Suggestion of Bias that he filed
against an earlier guardian ad litem who had considered Michael as having a potential
conflict of interest because of the residual funds in Terri's trust account. Id.
161 Mick Schneider, Schiavo Dies at Hospice, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
Mar. 31, 2005, at 1.
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B. Ideological Interests
Clearly, the case of Terri Schiavo involved the attachment of
ideological interests to her fate. The Schindlers were supported in
their efforts to keep Terri alive by numerous right-to-life and disabil-
ity rights groups. Their support varied from the financial to the politi-
cal, from appeals through the media to filings of amicus briefs. 162 On
its face, such advocacy might have signaled something very positive,
if the concern had truly been about Terri's fate, wishes, and interests.
However, much of the work of these groups in connection with Terri's
case did not have such focus and concern, but was substantially about
other causes that such groups wished to advance, such as the protec-
tion of fetuses and embryos for right-to-life groups and the protection
of severely disabled, but not permanently vegetative, patients for dis-
ability rights groups. As a check on whose interests they were seeking
to advance we might ask, which among these groups stood up for
Terri's medical privacy in addition to her "right to life"? The answer,
as far as I can tell, was none.
In Terri's case, adherence to or faith in certain ideologies became
important as a political matter as well. It appeared to be in President
George W. Bush and Florida Governor Jeb Bush's political interests,
and those of many state and U.S. legislators, to intervene in Terri's
case with special legislation designed to cause the reinsertion of her
feeding tube. In October 2003, Florida passed Terri's Law,163 allow-
162 See Stephen Nohlgren & Tom Zucco, Schiavo Case Has Myriad Fund
Sources, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at IA. Examples of those who sup-
ported the Schindlers are the Alliance Defense Fund, Life Legal Defense Foundation,
RightMarch, the Family Research Council. Id. The American Civil Liberties Union
provided most of the appellate work for Michael Schiavo. Id.
163 Terri's Law essentially only applied to Terri Schiavo. It read:
Section 1. (1) The Governor shall have the authority to issue a one-time stay
to prevent the withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient if, as of
October 15, 2003:
(a) That patient has no written advance directive;
(b) The court has found that patient to be in a persistent vegetative
state;
(c) That patient has had nutrition and hydration withheld; and
(d) A member of that patient's family has challenged the withholding
of nutrition and hydration.
(2) The Governor's authority to issue the stay expires 15 days after the ef-
fective date of this act, and the expiration of that authority does not impact
the validity or the effect of any stay issued pursuant to this act. The Gover-
nor may lift the stay authorized under this act at any time. A person may not
be held civilly liable and is not subject to regulatory or disciplinary sanc-
tions for taking any action to comply with a stay issued by the Governor
pursuant to this act.
[Vol. 16:631
IN RESPECT OF PEOPLE
ing the governor to order the reinsertion of the tube, a law declared
unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court in fall 2004.164 In
March 2005, the U.S. Congress passed special legislation allowing for
federal court review of the Schindlers' claims that Terri's federal
rights were being violated when her tube had once again been re-
moved according to a state court order.1 65 By supporting this special
legislation, civic leaders were able to show their solidarity with cer-
tain religious organizations on the issue of protecting vulnerable life.
With Terri Schiavo, the extent to which political and ideological
groups took up (what they asserted to be) her cause, and benefited
from using her as their focal point in making ideological and political
points, is certainly unusual. Terri's case, however, reveals but an ex-
aggeration of how the ideological interests of others can determine
what is done with an individual's life. One way in which the ideologi-
cal interests of others in the treatment decisions of a person in a per-
manent vegetative state may come into play is in the recommendation
of physicians to continue feeding because they, the physicians, believe
that feeding is the "right" thing to do. Of course, not all physicians
believe that feeding a person in a permanent vegetative state is ethi-
cally required, and the American Medical Association and other phy-
sicians' groups have adopted policies to respect patient and/or family
wishes in this regard. 166 But a substantial number do believe that feed-
ing is always required and their beliefs about this matter are given
substantial weight by family members who cede to the physicians'
preferred course of treatment.1 67 In fact, often little discussion takes
(3) Upon the issuance of a stay, the chief judge of the circuit court shall ap-
point a guardian ad litem for the patient to make recommendations to the
Governor and the court.
Section 2. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.
S.B. 12-E, H.B. 35-E (Fla. 2003).
164 Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004).
165 Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119
Stat. 15 (2005).
1 6 See Task Force Report, Part I, supra note 16, at 1499-1500.
167 See Kirk Payne et al., Physicians' Attitudes about the Care of Patients in
the Persistent Vegetative State: A National Survey, 125 ANN. INT. MED. 104 (1996).
Payne et al. report that 29 percent of medical directors surveyed and 47 percent of
neurologists surveyed believe that artificial nutrition and hydration should generally
be provided to individuals in a persistent vegetative state. At the same time, 89 per-
cent of medical directors and 88 percent of neurologists surveyed believe it is ethical
to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration according to the instructions
of a living will or a patient's surrogate. Id. See also Casarett et al., supra note 1, at
2607 (explaining that patients and families are often ill-informed about the risks and
benefits of artificial nutrition and hydration); COLBY, supra note 97, at 21-22 (describ-
ing the experience of Nancy Cruzan's parents in giving their consent to the surgical
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place about the issue and in the absence of any requirement for peri-
odical revisiting of the decision, feeding can continue for many years
on the basis of nothing more substantial than physicians' prefer-
ences. 168 Yet, while patients and their family members often follow
physicians' recommendations regarding treatment, the decision here is
not a medical one. Yes, tube feeding will sustain life (a medical judg-
ment), but the ultimate question to be answered for the patient is
whether that life should be sustained, a question that doctors are no
more qualified to answer than anybody else. So, in a sense, while
Terri lived for a number of years, in part, for right-to-life, religious,
and disability rights groups, rather than for herself, so too are many
other patients in a permanent vegetative state living, at least in part,
for physicians who recommended that their feeding be continued.
C. Personal Interests
The personal non-financial interests involved in the Terri Schiavo
case and in the case of many patients in a permanent vegetative state
are naturally somewhat difficult to unpack. They typically involve
close human relationships, which can be intricate (to put it nicely) and
messy (to put it more bluntly). On the one hand, as a society we want
to recognize, support, and value such relationships to the extent they
are beneficial to those involved. We assume, with respect to spouses
and family members, that such relationships are beneficial. To some
extent, our laws regarding the cessation of life- sustaining treatment
do, and I think should, exhibit some deference to the importance of
such marital, familial and other relationships. However, that is not,
and should not be, the law's focus. Rather, that focus is on what the
patient would want or, if that is impossible to know, on the patient's
interests. The family's interests are not directly at issue and certainly
are not supposed to drive decisions about treatment. That does not
mean that the family's involvement is not respected and valued. It
simply means that that involvement is supposed to be directed toward
the patient and not the self.
With respect to Terri Schiavo, the Schindlers accused Michael
Schiavo of wishing to essentially dispose of Terri so that he might go
insertion of a feeding tube for their daughter). But see Lindsay A. Hampson & Ezekiel
J. Emanuel, The Prognosis for Changes in End-of-Life Care After the Schiavo Case,
24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 972 (2005) (predicting increased conflict, following Schiavo,
between physicians who wish to terminate treatment and family members who wish
to continue it).
168 See generally COLBY, supra note 97 (describing the experience of the
Cruzan family).
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on with his new life with his girlfriend of several years and the two
children they had had together.169 Michael Schiavo countered that he
was only trying to advocate for what Terri would have wanted, as
evidenced by statements that she made to him and others.17° That, he
said, is why he refused to divorce Terri, because then she would be
subjected to continued life against her wishes by the Schindlers. 171
The Schindlers' personal interest in Terri's continued life can and
should have been challenged in the same manner as Michael
Schiavo's alleged interest in Terri's demise. There are several possible
ways of understanding their interests, but the most likely and also the
most charitable, are that they had an interest in her continued life sim-
ply because they loved her.
The law might be understood as valuing such caring connections
by designating family members as the default surrogates when the
patient has not appointed one. But even if that is somewhat true, the
idea behind designating family members as surrogates is not to ad-
vance the surrogate's own interests before, or instead of, the interests
of the patient. Rather, as discussed above, allowing family members
to step in to speak for the patient is justified on the grounds that the
surrogate will be most motivated to advocate for the patient's interests
and will also know, better than a stranger or even a friend, what the
patient would want if she could decide for herself.
But the Schindlers' arguments for removing Michael Schiavo as
guardian and replacing him with one of the two of them did not em-
phasize their superior ability to discern, or their greater inclination to
respect, Terri's wishes. In fact, a guardian ad litem's comprehensive
report to the Florida governor and the court revealed the Schindlers'
willingness to push for continued feeding of Terri Schiavo even if
they believed she would have wanted to die.' 72 The report discloses
that at one point in the proceedings to determine what should be done
about Terri's continued feeding, members of the Schindler family
were questioned about their commitment to do everything medically
possible to keep Terri alive. 73 According to the guardian ad litem,
they were asked about a number of "gruesome examples."'174 For ex-
ample, they were asked whether they would agree to Terri's foregoing
169 See Jamie Thompson, She 's the Other Woman in Michael Schiavo's Heart,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at IA.
170 Gail Gibson, Schiavo Dies, Anger Remains, BALT. SUN, Apr. 1, 2005, at
IA.
171 Id.
172 WOLFSON, supra note 13, at 14.
173 Id.
174 id.
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a highly invasive heart surgery if Terri at that point also had had all
four limbs amputated because of gangrene.' 75 They replied that yes,
the surgery should be done.76 The report continues, "Within the tes-
timony, as part of the hypotheticals presented, Schindler family mem-
bers stated that even if Theresa had told them of her intention to have
artificial nutrition withdrawn, they would not do it."
177
The various positions that the Schindlers took throughout the liti-
gation and media war on the issue of continuing feeding emphasized
either that there was hope for Terri's recovery or that feeding is a
form of basic care that cannot be withdrawn-not that they, better
than Michael Schiavo, would have respected Terri's autonomy by
attempting to duplicate the decision she would make. Moreover, their
answers to the hypothetical "gruesome examples" with which they
were presented showed their reluctance to engage in any sort of bal-
ancing between the burdens and benefits of treatment options (in other
words, concern for Terri's interests)-rather their position seemed
simply that life must be pursued at all cost.
The Schindlers are certainly welcome to their views about the
value of all life, and if they wish to adopt a "vitalist" approach-life at
all or nearly any cost-then that is their prerogative to do so. But it is
not their prerogative to impose that view on someone else, even if it is
their daughter. And the crux of the problem with our current statutory
approach to these decisions is that a surrogate essentially has the
power to do just that. In Terri Schiavo's case, the Schindlers were not
Terri's surrogate. But their strategy of attempting to remove Michael
Schiavo and insert themselves in that role reveals the flaw of our cur-
rent legal apparatus. They knew that who the surrogate was could
make all the difference. Coupled with the presumption in favor of tube
feeding, the appointment of Terri's parents as her surrogate would
mean that she could have lived for several more decades for their
sake, and only for their sake.
V. CHANGING THE PRESUMPTION
How can we avoid the intrusion of others' interests in the treat-
ment decisions that are made for incompetent patients? In the case of
most incompetent patients, this is indeed a very tall order. For a
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. During the trial at which this testimony took place, the Schindlers,
according to the Guardian's Ad Litem report, acknowledged that Terri was in a per-
sistent vegetative state, although they would later raise challenges to that diagnosis.
Id.
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minimally functioning patient whose spouse arrives daily to visit and
interact, even in a minimal way with the patient, it would be very dif-
ficult to determine when the spouse, acting as surrogate, is consider-
ing the patient's interests or the spouse's own interests. But with indi-
viduals in a permanent vegetative state, the answers are clearer. As
argued above, because such individuals have no present or future in-
terest in living, they should be treated differently from other severely
disabled individuals. The law should recognize that because of the
unique situation of people in a permanent vegetative state, the surro-
gate's role in such cases is more limited than in the case of the termi-
nally ill or severely disabled because the surrogate does not need to
engage in any complex balancing of the burdens and benefits of con-
tinued feeding of the patient.
Because people in a permanent vegetative state receive no benefit
from continued living, there should be a presumption that they be al-
lowed to die. Otherwise, they are simply living for others and are
treated essentially as an object rather than as a person. The exception
that we should maintain is that we should continue to feed the person
who is now in a permanent vegetative state if such would be accord-
ing to her wishes. Thus, while the presumption would change in favor
of discontinuing feeding, it could be rebutted by evidence of the per-
son's desires. The surrogate's role in the case of people in a perma-
nent vegetative state would then be to bring forward any evidence that
the person would have wanted to continue to be fed. An equally im-
portant role would be to guard and protect the patient against inva-
sions of her bodily integrity and medical privacy.
As described above, state law now generally provides that surro-
gates can decide to discontinue treatment only if they have clear and
convincing evidence that such decisions would be a patient's prefer-
ence or, absent evidence of patient preferences, that such decisions
would be in the patient's best interest. In its stead, the law I propose
would read that, at a certain time (such as a year) following diagnosis
of a patient's permanent vegetative condition, 7 ' all life-sustaining
treatment (including nutrition and hydration) would be terminated
unless the surrogate makes a decision in favor of continued treatment
178 Since under current clinical criteria, a diagnosis for pennanent vegetative-
ness is made after three months in a vegetative state for those suffering a nontrau-
matic injury and one year for those suffering a traumatic injury, judicial or quasi-
judicial review would not be required until at least one year and three months, in the
case of nontraumatic injury, and two years, in the case of traumatic injury, after the
patient had entered a condition of vegetativeness. Prior to required judicial review but
after the diagnosis of permanent vegetativeness, a surrogate could withdraw tube
feeding unless clearly contrary to the patient's preferences.
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on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that continued treatment
would be the patient's preference. 79 Gone would be the individual-
ized best interests analysis out of recognition that patients in a perma-
nent vegetative state uniformly have no present or future interest in
living that they can experience. Only if the patient would have wished
for continued feeding would it be permitted out of respect for the pa-
tient's autonomy. Under this proposed reform, surrogates would not
be permitted to authorize the continued feeding of a vegetative patient
to further their own or others' interests. The state's role in protecting
the patient from being used as an instrument for others takes prece-
dence over the state's interest in sustaining vegetative life.
The justification for this change in the presumption is that contin-
ued feeding of the vegetative patient, if not in accordance with the
person's wishes, is driven only by the interests of others and not by
the interests of the patient. Such forced use of the body of the person
for others' interests does a wrong to that person even though she can-
not experience such wrong. Norman Cantor gives us an example of
such an invasion of the person by asking us to consider whether a
photographer who snuck into a hospital room of a vegetative patient
and took pictures of her, which he later published, would be invading
her privacy.18 0 Most people would probably think that such an action
would be invasive. 181 That example seems almost quaint compared to
the invasion of privacy that has occurred with Terri Schiavo.1
82
The wrong does not have to involve privacy concerns, however,
and can simply occur through use of the person's body, as another
example that Cantor provides reveals, that of organ harvesting.' 8 3 We
do not allow the harvesting of non-vital organs from patients in a
permanent vegetative state even though they can continue living in
their vegetative state without those organs. We do not, for example,
harvest the corneas of those patients, even though they cannot use the
corneas to see and others may be able to. The body of the patient in a
179 If a proposal such as this one were adopted, we would have to give further
consideration to the appropriate burden of proof. Preponderance of the evidence could
also be considered. In addition to choosing between a preponderance of the evidence
standard or a clear and convincing standard, there are further questions as to what
kind of evidence might be considered-for example, whether only statements of the
patient should be considered, and if so, how specific they must be, or whether evi-
dence of the patient's values and personalities can also carry weight.
180 Cantor, supra note 85, at 404.
181 Id.
182 Donors of $100 or more to the Life Legal Defense Foundation (which
helped pay for the Schindlers' legal fees) could receive a videotape of Terri Schiavo
in her bed. Nohlgren & Zucco, supra note 162, at IA.
183 Id.
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permanent vegetative state is not for others to mine, either for parts or
images. But neither is it for people to sustain indefinitely in order to
advance more abstract interests-such as the personal interest of par-
ents in not losing a child, or the ideological interests of a physician in
providing all available treatment.
VI. OBJECTIONS
While my argument in favor of a presumption against feeding for
a person in a permanent vegetative state is based upon the fact that
there is no reason to continue to feed that has any relevance to that
person, one might object that there are reasons unrelated to the per-
son's benefit that can justify continued feeding. I consider such possi-
ble reasons below. The problem with each of them is that they in es-
sence prove my point; reasons unrelated to the person's benefit are
inherently suspect, and upon closer examination, are not justified out
of respect for the person whose treatment is being considered.
The most charitable reasons for a presumption in favor of feeding
in the absence of evidence of the patient's wishes are: (1) feeding is
basic care, which we have a duty to provide for all people; (2) all hu-
man life is precious and should be sustained because of the sanctity of
life; (3) most people would want to be fed even if they have become
permanently unconscious (if that were true); (4) feeding people in a
permanent vegetative state is necessary in order to ensure proper care
and respect of other severely disabled human beings; (5) we should
allow continued feeding out of concern for loved ones.1
84
A. Objection: Feeding Is Basic Care
The idea that withholding nutrition and hydration from a person is
different from withholding other types of life-sustaining procedures-
because it represents a lack of care and a form of abuse in hastening
death-was central to the controversy surrounding Terri Schiavo.
Supporters of the Schindlers repeatedly charged that Terri's husband
and the courts were making decisions to "starve" her to death.
185
184 Some might object that my proposal does not go far enough-that if the
decision is made to discontinue tube feeding, which will certainly lead to death, then
why not provide the patient with a lethal injection to hasten the process? This objec-
tion involves questions about euthanasia that go well beyond the situation of people in
a permanent vegetative state, and applies equally to our current system that allows
(but with much more difficulty) surrogates to withdraw tube feeding.
185 See Bruce Hosking, Mom Makes Plea to Save Daughter; Congress Move
Could Reinstate Feeding Tube for Terri Schiavo, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 20, 2005, at
A02 (describing protestors symbolically attempting to bring food and water to Terri
Schiavo outside her hospice); CNN News: Terri Schiavo, 41, Dies (CNN television
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When Terri's Law was passed in 2003, there were many references by
supporters of the law to a "stay of execution" for Terri. 86 When the
Schindlers in early 2004 filed a petition urging that Terri be given
swallowing tests and therapy, they invoked a Florida statute providing
that it is a felony to withhold food from a disabled or vulnerable
adult. 187 In the spring of 2004, a bill was introduced into the Florida
legislature to adopt more stringent procedures for withdrawing nutri-
tion and hydration from an incompetent patient as compared to the
procedures applicable to the withdrawal of other life-sustaining treat-
ments. 188 The bill's title is a testament to the emotional nature of the
question of feeding: the "Starvation and Dehydration of Persons with
Disabilities Prevention Act."' 89 In early 2005, with the third removal
of Terri's feeding tube imminent, the Florida legislature again consid-
ered, but did not pass, legislation that would make withdrawal of tube
feeding from people in a permanent vegetative state virtually impossi-
ble in the absence of a written living will.' 90
broadcast Mar. 31, 2005) (featuring video clip of Rep. Tom DeLay stating, "A young
woman in Florida is being dehydrated and starved to death."); Nat'l Right to Life,
Spurred by Schindler-Schiavo Case, Model State Law to Prevent Starvation and De-
hydration Proposed, http://www.nrlc.org/euthanasia/ModelBillAnnoucement.html
[hereinafter NRLC MODEL STATE LAW] (last visited Sept. 30, 2005) (National Right
to Life Committee's charge of starvation); Issues Surrounding Terri Schindler-
Schiavo Are Disability Rights Issues, Say National Disability Organizations, Oct.
27, 2003, available at http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/schiavostatement.html
(signed by twenty-three national disability rights groups and referring to Ms.
Schiavo's "death by starvation").
186 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, In Florida Right-to-Die Case, Legislation That
Puts the Constitution at Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A20 ("'It's beautifully
badly drafted,' said Patrick 0. Gudridge, a law professor at the University of
Miami .... 'They wanted to use the word 'stay," Professor Gudridge said of the
[Florida] Legislature, 'because the analogy is to a stay of execution."').
187 Petitioners' Response to Court's Request Regarding Guardian Ad Litem,
In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 5, 2004). See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 825.102(3) (West 2000), which in certain circumstances makes
neglect of an elderly or disabled adult a felony and defines neglect to include:
A caregiver's failure or omission to provide an elderly person or disabled
adult with the care, supervision, and services necessary to maintain the eld-
erly person's or disabled adult's physical and mental health, including, but
not limited to, food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, and
medical services that a prudent person would consider essential for the
well-being of the elderly person or disabled adult.
188 S.B. 692 (Fla. 2004).
189 S.B. 692. This bill was modeled on an act proposed by the National Right
to Life Committee. See NRLC MODEL STATE LAW, supra note 185.
190 H.B. 0701 (Fla. 2005). The Florida Senate also considered a bill that took
a different approach, prohibiting the removal of a feeding tube from an individual in a
permanent vegetative state in the event of disagreement among individuals who could
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The Pope of the Roman Catholic Church also weighed in on the
issue. In the spring of 2004, in the midst of publicity about Terri
Schiavo's case, Pope John Paul II released a statement declaring that
artificial nutrition and hydration were not like other medical
treatments, but constituted "basic care." 191 Accordingly, society has a
duty to provide tube feeding for patients like Terri. While not
considered canon law, this statement of the Pope drew much attention.
At the time, the Church's policy and the practice of Catholic hospitals
in the United States had been to allow family members more
discretion to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration for patients in
a permanent vegetative state. 92 The Pope's statement called that
policy into question.
These developments challenge what had appeared to be a legal
and medical consensus that the provision of artificial nutrition and
hydration was like other life-sustaining medical treatment which
could, if unwanted, constitute intrusions of bodily integrity that are
unacceptable under medical ethics, common law, and constitutional
law principles. Since the 1980s, courts have consistently (but not uni-
formly) held that artificial nutrition and hydration (feeding by tube)
have served as an individual's surrogate under the statutory hierarchy for surrogacy
status. S. 0804C1 (Fla. 2005).191 Pope John Paul II, Address to the Participants in the International Con-
gress on "Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and
Ethical Dilemmas," available at http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/john_paul-ii/
speeches/2004/march/documents/hfjp-iispe_20040320_congress-fiamcen.html
(Mar. 20, 2004). The Pope's address contained the following passages, among others,
relating to the care owed to the person in a permanent vegetative state:
The sick person in a vegetative state, awaiting recovery or a natural end,
still has the right to basic health care (nutrition, hydration, cleanliness,
warmth, etc.), and to the prevention of complications related to his con-
finement to bed. He also has the right to appropriate rehabilitative care and
to be monitored for clinical signs of eventual recovery.
I should like particularly to underline how the administration of water and
food, even when provided by artificial means, always represents a natural
means of preserving life, not a medical act. Its use, furthermore, should be
considered, in principle, ordinary and proportionate, and as such morally
obligatory, insofar as and until it is seen to have attained its proper finality,
which in the present case consists in providing nourishment to the patient
and alleviation of his suffering.
Id. See generally Leonard J. Nelson, III, Catholic Bioethics and the Case of Terri
Schiavo, 35 CuMB. L. REv. 543, 567 (2005).
192 This was permitted under the more general policy that artificial nutrition
and hydration can be withdrawn from incompetent patients when continued treatment
is burdensome to the patient or the patient's family. Nelson, III, supra note 191, at
571.
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should be understood in the same way as a ventilator, or dialysis, or
other invasive medical procedures used to prolong life.1
93
What are we to make of this argument that feeding is basic care
and should not be withdrawn? How strong an objection is this to a
presumption in favor of discontinuing the feeding of a person in a
permanent vegetative state?
The problem with this objection is its presumption that "basic
care" means something that we all know and understand. Labeling
something as "basic care" does not make it so, nor does it explain
what the label is intended to mean.
In our particular instance, the instance of the person in a perma-
nent vegetative state, we have to go beyond the label and question
what might be meant. What is the impetus, motivation, ultimate goal
of the provision of basic care?
While feeding can continue the life of a person in a permanent
vegetative state, and can do so without physical burden, it does not
necessarily constitute required care. For one, it is not "experienced" as
care by the patient, who is unaware that she is being fed or that she
has been fed. We might contrast this situation to that of a severely
disabled, conscious patient who might experience care in the form of
feeding by the social relationship created through feeding or by the
physical pleasure of eating through the experience of taste or satiation.
In that instance, the argument that feeding is basic care is more con-
vincing, but it does not apply to our case.
Second, even if we might consider feeding to be basic care not
because of the experience of feeding in and of itself, but because of
the end it produces-continuation of life-there are difficulties with
this conception of feeding as applied to the permanently vegetative
patient as well. This argument of feeding as basic care would apply to
the person in a coma, but not a person in a permanent vegetative state.
We may well think that feeding is required for someone in a coma
even though they cannot experience such feeding as care because for
that person there may be some possibility of recovery. Feeding per-
petuates the life of the comatose person with the possibility that life
may once again be experienced. But in the case of the permanently
vegetative patient, there is virtually no possibility of a life that will
ever be experienced again.
193 See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 90, at § 6.03[G][4] (3rd ed. 2005)
(reporting the "virtual unanimity among appellate courts permitting the foregoing of
medically supplied nutrition and hydration"). See also In re Browning, 568 So.2d 4,
11-12 (Fla. 1990) ("Courts overwhelmingly have held that a person may refuse or
remove artificial life-support, whether supplying oxygen by a mechanical respirator
or supplying food and water through a feeding tube.").
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Neither the social act of providing food as a form of care nor the
outcome produced by food (continued life) is experienced by the per-
son in a permanent vegetative state. Lack of the ability to experience
is not enough, however, to dismiss the idea that a certain degree of
care is owed to such patients. Some of the motivation here is under-
standable. We would want the vegetative patient to be kept clean and
presentable and free of bed sores to the extent possible even though
she would not know the difference, even though she would not benefit
in terms of any experience. How is feeding different from these com-
mon and expected acts of human decency?
For people in a permanent vegetative state, tube feeding is less
like these acts of common decency and more like a ventilator because
the provision of nutrition and hydration through a PEG tube is not
about respecting the body's integrity or its appearance but is solely
about sustaining life. In fact, the surgically inserted feeding tube is an
invasion of bodily integrity and the nutrition and hydration supplied
through that tube commonly causes a bloated appearance of the
body. 194
Feeding tubes, ventilators, and dialysis machines for people in a
permanent vegetative state sustain their lives, but because they have
no interest in continuing to live those lives, removal of these treat-
ments is appropriate. When we remove a ventilator from a patient, we
understand that the patient may die, but we do not say that we are
causing her to suffocate to death; when we remove dialysis we do not
say we are poisoning the patient. Statements that Tern Schiavo was
starved to death are likewise inflammatory, suggesting a lack of care
that is not true.
The care that is owed here (to the body and its appearance) is like
that owed to everyone-from a temporarily unconscious person to a
dead person. Those who have temporarily lost consciousness or who
have died also cannot experience how their body is treated, but we
treat them with respect and care-and not just respect for people in
general, but respect for these particular people or, in the case of the
dead, the person they were.
194 See COLBY, supra note 97, at 84, 384 (describing the appearance of per-
manently vegetative patient Nancy Cruzan during the provision of artificial nutrition
and hydration and after its removal).
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B. Objection: All Human Life Is Precious and Should Be Sustained
Because of the Sanctity of Life
This, the "vitalist" position, is concerned with valuing and sus-
taining human life of any quality and kind. 195 It may extend to em-
bryos and fetuses as well as to patients in a permanent vegetative
state. 1 The vitalist argument was voiced repeatedly and loudly in the
controversy over Terri Schiavo. Some of the strongest supporters of
the Schindlers were right-to-life groups who have traditionally been
more concerned with protecting nascent human life than protecting
patients in a permanent vegetative state.
1 97
A pure vitalist approach would not allow the discontinuation of
life support mechanisms even where such treatments caused burdens
to the patient, such as pain or discomfort, and even where such treat-
ments were specifically rejected by the patient. 198 No state has
adopted such a strict position.
199
A more limited vitalist position has been determined to be consti-
tutionally permissible. The Supreme Court, in the Cruzan case in
1990, recognized that states may assert an unqualified interest in life
that permits them to continue life-sustaining treatment for incompe-
tent patients in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the
patient expressly directed otherwise prior to losing competency.00
According to the Court, if an error of judgment might occur in these
life or death decisions, the state is entirely justified in erring on the
side of life.
20 1
While the Supreme Court has given considerable latitude to states
in asserting an interest in life and therefore limiting the right of in-
competent individuals to have their life-sustaining treatment with-
drawn, the states have also been free to adopt more permissive stan-
195 See Boozang, supra note 143. For a recent, thorough critique of the vitalist
position, see Alicia R. Ouellette, When Vitalism is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination
Against and Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treat-
ment, 79 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (2004).
196 Robertson, supra note 100, at 121 (describing both the Schiavo contro-
versy and the embryonic stem cell debate as "involv[ing] a clash between strongly
held vitalist views and a more pragmatic approach to questions of human dignity").
197 See Nohlgren & Zucco, supra note 162, at 1A.
198 See Boozang, supra note 143 at 567 ("the sanctity-of-life principle, or
vitalism, rests on the notion that life is an end in itself').
199 See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 90, at § 1.07[B].
200 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding
Missouri's law requiring clear and convincing evidence of expressed wishes of
woman in persistent vegetative state before allowing withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration).
201 Id. at 283.
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dards. Most states have in fact done So. 20 2 In addition to allowing sur-
rogates to make a substituted judgment for the patient on the basis of
evidence weaker than the patient's previously expressed preferences,
a number of states also allow the withdrawing of life-sustaining treat-
ment on the basis of the patient's best interests. 20 3 Thus, most states,
including Florida, do not adopt what might be considered a strong
vitalist approach, but do assert an interest in continued life by a pre-
sumption against discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment.0 4
Even the more moderate vitalist might well object to my proposal
to change this presumption so that continued feeding of the person in
a permanent vegetative state is disfavored. The argument might be
stated as follows: because human life of all sorts is valuable for its
own sake, as an end in itself, then it should be sustained unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that the individual would not wish it, or
it is burdensome to the patient. In other words, the existing law with
its presumption in favor of continued tube feeding and other medical
treatment has it just right. It strikes an appropriate balance between
the rights of the patient to autonomous decision-making, the interests
of the patient in avoiding pain and suffering, and the state's interest in
sustaining life. Why meddle with it?
202 See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 90, at § 2.03[A][1] (noting that
while some other states also require the use of a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard with respect to honoring the actual or probable wishes of the patient, only Mis-
souri and New York have required clear and convincing evidence that the patient
herself authorized treatment withdrawal).
203 See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 90, at § 4.07[B] (pointing out that
while some courts accept the best interests standard, few have actually applied it). A
few states have maintained a strict, though not pure, vitalist position by requiring
advance written directives before permitting the discontinuation of life-sustaining
treatment, thus completely denying treatment withdrawal for individuals who have
never been competent. New York has for years had one of the strictest positions in
this regard and the recent case of Sheila Pouliot has forced a reconsideration of its
merits. In that case a mentally retarded, terminally ill individual was forced to un-
dergo life-sustaining treatments rejected by her surrogate. The treatments prolonged
her life by only a few weeks but caused considerable pain and bodily degradation.
Recent legislation, enacted in part in response to a lawsuit brought by Pouliot's guard-
ian, has modified New York's law to allow more flexibility in withdrawal of treat-
ment decisions. See Ouellette, supra note 195, at 2-3. It is difficult to predict, how-
ever, whether on the whole the law is developing toward less or more of a vitalist
position. While New York's recent legislative change suggests a growing awareness
that the costs (especially in terms of pain and suffering) of sustaining all life must be
considered, the acts of the governor and legislature in Florida in respect to Terri
Schiavo, and the legislature's consideration of legislation to further restrict discon-
tinuation of nutrition and hydration suggest the openness of at least some state legisla-
tors to a more vitalist position.
204 See discussion supra Part III.B.
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The reason to revise current state law to provide for a presumption
against feeding in a permanent vegetative state, and to reject even the
limited vitalist position of most state law (including Florida), is that
such a revision would in fact exhibit more respect for the individual
human life than a presumption in favor of continued living would.
Why is this so? Because the heart of the principle to respect human
life is to respect the individual human life, not the process of life
itself. In other words, it is what has come together to make a living
person that is to be respected, rather than individual living cells.
Right-to-life advocates, for example, who object to research on human
embryos, do not generally object to research on mere cells, even if the
cells are living and contain a full set of human DNA. To such
advocates, research on adult stem cells is permissible, but research on
embryonic stem cells is not, since the latter involves the destruction of
a human embryo, which they believe is a person.20 5
It is the individual human life that is endowed with the qualities
that command respect as a person. For the religious, this may be con-
nected to the creation of an individual human soul. For those who
apply such principles to embryos, the combining of the genetic mate-
rial of the gametes creates the individual human life. But it is not life
processes themselves that are valued for their own sake. As an earlier
encyclical letter of Pope John Paul II states,
[F]rom the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun
which is neither that of the father nor the mother; it is rather
the life of a new human being with his own growth. It would
never be made human if it were not human already. This has
always been clear, and ... modem genetic science offers clear
confirmation. It has demonstrated that from the first instance
there is established the program of what this living being will
205 See, e.g., the following statement made by The Coalition of Americans for
Research Ethics:
Stem cell research promises great good and is a worthy scientific priority as
long as we pursue it ethically. Obtaining stem cells from people without se-
riously harming people in the process can be ethical. However, obtaining
stem cells from human embryos cannot be ethical because it necessarily in-
volves destroying those embryos.
Coal. of Ams. for Research Ethics, On Human Embryos and Stem Cell Research: The
Founding Statement of Do No Harm: The Coalition of Americans for Research Ethics
(Jul. 1, 1999), http://www.stemcellresearch.org/statement/index.html. The website of
The Coalition of Americans for Research Ethics is referenced in the website of the
National Right to Life Committee. Nat'l Right to Life, Killing Human Embryos:
(Human Cloning and Related Issues), http://www.nrlc.org/killingembryos/index.
html (last visited May 15, 2006).
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be: a person, this individual person with his characteristic as-
pects already well determined. °6
In explaining why prenatal human life must be respected, the Pope's
encyclical letter emphasizes the individuality of every human being
with its own genetic make-up. The text's focus is not on the presence
of mere primitive human biological functions, such as respiration, but
on unique human individuality.
So how do we best respect the individual person who has entered
a permanent vegetative state? Merely acknowledging that her body
continues to function and insisting that it function perpetually is not
the answer. The individual who was Terri Schiavo had been stripped
by medical trauma of all qualities that might matter to her individual-
ity-that might make her a person with individual qualities of any
sort-excepting relationships with others. But these relationships with
others were no longer her relationships, because she could not experi-
ence them. The relationships, with family and friends, only benefited
others.
Rather than err on the side of life, which can never be experi-
enced, the law should err on the side of not allowing one individual to
be used for another-it should err on the side of the inviolability of the
individual. A presumption in favor of discontinuing artificial nutrition
and hydration actually shows more respect for the individual human
life than a presumption in favor of continued living, because it ac-
knowledges that the individual qualities of the person have been lost.
As has already been shown, a presumption in favor of continued liv-
ing allows the individual in a permanent vegetative state to be treated
as a means to others' ends, rather than an end in herself.
In this regard it is important to emphasize, again, that the changes
to the law that I propose do not affect individuals who are capable of
experiencing life, even if in a limited fashion. Such cases of individu-
als with severe disabilities are distinctly different from the case of the
person in a permanent vegetative state. There, as with assessing bene-
fits as against burdens of living, one would have to engage in a more
complex assessment of whether it is best to err on the side of life
(which can be experienced) or on the side of the inviolability of the
individual. Because life cannot be experienced by people in a perma-
nent vegetative state, they have no interest in continuing it. At the
same time, our duties to treat them as persons deserving of respect
206 Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (The Gospel of Life) (1995) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
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continues. That respect means that we should err on the side of pro-
tecting them from being used by others.
C. Objection: Most People Would Want to Be Fed in a Permanent
Vegetative State
Some might argue that a presumption in favor of discontinuing
feeding presumes in essence that most people would not want to be
fed in these circumstances. That is not the basis for my argument
against feeding the permanently vegetative.2 °7 Making decisions about
whether someone should live or die on the basis of how a majority of
people would feel about living in this or that condition would deny the
individual nature of such decisions. There would be no obvious reason
to confine such basis for decision-making to those in a permanent
vegetative state, and the possibility of uninformed bias against life in
certain disabled states would be great. The basis for my argument
against feeding the permanently vegetative is not a majority-based
"substituted judgment" for the person whose desires are unknown; it
is instead based upon the lack of any benefit to continued living com-
bined with the vulnerability of being used as an instrument to others'
ends.
That said, however, what if there were evidence that most people
would in fact affirmatively want to be fed in a state of permanent
vegetation? Such evidence would call into question the accuracy of
my evaluation that such people have no interests in present or future
life. It would suggest that perhaps there are interests in living that I
have overlooked but that most people feel exist-and that we need to
dig deeper to discover what those interests might be.
Not surprisingly, however, most people, when asked whether they
would want to be kept alive by a feeding tube if they became perma-
nently unconscious, answer "no." In fact, they answer no in over-
whelming percentages. Justice Brennan's dissent in the 1990 Cruzan
case cites a Colorado University Graduate School of Public Affairs'
study in which 85 percent of those people questioned answered that
they would not want a feeding tube if they became permanently un-
conscious.20 8 Surveys taken during the unfolding of the Schiavo con-
troversy in 2005 were consistent with this earlier survey data. They
207 But see Cantor, supra note 90, at 1197 (arguing that "the preference of a
previously competent patient--in the absence of explicit instructions or special per-
sonal values concerning death and dying--should be grounded on default principles
drawn from most people's vision of intolerable indignity").
208 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 312 n.11 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
686 HEAL TH AMTRIX [Vol. 16:631
IN RESPECT OF PEOPLE
also revealed that a high percentage of Americans (78 percent to 82
percent) would not want to be kept alive if they were in a permanent
vegetative state.209
D. Objection: Feeding the Person in a Permanent Vegetative State Is
Necessary in Order to Ensure Proper Care and Respect of Other
Severely Disabled Human Beings
The concern of this objection is somewhat of a "slippery slope"
argument. If the law presumes that we should not feed individuals in a
permanent vegetative state, then might the law likewise embrace pre-
sumptions against life for other individuals in severely disabled condi-
tions? In important ways, a concern to protect other severely disabled
individuals rather than those in a permanent vegetative state or, more
particularly, Terri Schiavo herself, seemed to be the impetus behind a
number of disability rights groups' support of the Schindlers' cause to
keep Terri Schiavo alive. For example, twenty-one national disability
rights organizations signed a letter in October of 2003 in support of
the continued feeding of Terri Schiavo that spoke as much or more
about people with disabilities in general than it did about Terri, com-
paring her situation with that of persons with Down syndrome, au-
tism, and ALS. 210 The letter stated that the "life-and-death issues sur-
rounding Terri Schindler-Schiavo are first and foremost disability
rights issues" and "Terri Schindler-Schiavo's fate is entwined with all
disabled people who rely on surrogates. 211
It is certainly right for advocates for people with disabilities to be
concerned about the law of end-of-life decision-making and how it
may reflect prejudice and intolerance of disability and difference. But
the situation of the person in a permanent vegetative state must be
considered on its own terms, rather than as one sort of severe disabil-
ity. As explained above, there is a sharp difference between no cogni-
tion and some cognition, for the person with some cognition may ex-
perience some benefit to continued living. Failing to treat people in a
permanent vegetative state consonant with their condition in order to
protect other severely disabled people is but another example of in-
strumentality. Keeping Terri Schiavo alive for the benefit of other
209 See Robert J. Blendon et al., The American Public and the Terri Schiavo
Case, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2580, 2583 (2005) (citations omitted). When
asked specifically about disconnecting a feeding tube in such condition, the numbers
dropped to between 61 percent and 69 percent. Id.
210 ADA Watch et al., Statement, Terri Schindler-Schiavo and Disability
Rights, THEARcLINK.ORG (Oct. 27, 2003), available at http://www.thearclink.org/
news/article.asp?ID=623.
211 Id.
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people with severe disabilities is no more morally acceptable than
keeping her alive for her parents or for doctors or for the Governor of
Florida. It is especially disconcerting to witness groups who purport to
stand up for the vulnerable in our society to use one of those vulner-
able people for their cause.
Furthermore, failing to treat the person in a permanent vegetative
state differently, as their different circumstances warrant, might actu-
ally do a disservice to other severely disabled human beings.212 The
distinction between no capacity to experience life and some capacity
should be preserved and emphasized by those who believe that they
are doing good for people with disabilities by protecting them from
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. For people with severe
disabilities who are not permanently unconscious, there are benefits to
living that must be considered, and disability rights groups should
emphasize those interests. Because of those interests, perhaps we
should as a society err on the side of life for those individuals with
severe disabilities, but these considerations ring hollow for the person
in a permanent vegetative state.
E. Objection: We Should Allow Continued Feeding Out of Concern
for Loved Ones
Under my proposal, feeding would not be continued after a certain
time period unless the patient would have wanted it. Family members
would not be allowed to continue the lives of such individuals because
of their own needs or desires. If Mary Schindler had been designated
by statute to be Terri's surrogate, she would not under my proposal
have been permitted to keep Terri alive beyond the point at which
judicial or quasi-judicial review would automatically take place unless
she could prove Terri would have wanted continued feeding. An order
would be issued to discontinue feeding. This may seem rather harsh.
Should we not value family relationships? Should we not be sensitive
to the needs of those who are living and can experience the conse-
quences of the decision to discontinue feeding of their loved ones?
We should value family relationships and we should exhibit such
sensitivity, but there simply have to be limits unless we are going to
sanction long-term instrumental use of the permanently vegetative.
We should accommodate family interests, but not to the extent of al-
lowing those interests to trump respect for the patient.213 Such ac-
212 See generally Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo and the Disability Rights
Community: A Cause for Concern, 2006 U. C. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2006).
213 There may be instances in which the surrogate could show that the patient
wanted the surrogate to do what was in the interests of family members, and that what
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commodation may take the form of emotional support, the sharing of
information about the patient's condition from professionals to surro-
gate and vice versa, and the acquiescence in some delay or additional
period of observation or tests. Some delay, in fact, is built into the
process I propose. Feeding tubes can be removed upon a diagnosis of
a permanent vegetative state confirmed by at least two doctors, but if
they are not removed upon the surrogate's instigation, their continued
use will not be reviewed for a year or perhaps two. This additional
time would allow a family member some opportunity to understand
and perhaps accept the condition of the patient.
The well known case of Baby K suggests the need to exercise
some caution here. 21 4 In that case, the mother of an infant born with
anencephaly (a condition in which the child's upper brain is undevel-
oped and which is generally understood as involving no present or
future consciousness), insisted that her daughter be given respiratory
support to sustain her life.215 A court upheld her request against doc-
tors' insistence that such treatment was futile and therefore in conflict
with medical ethics.2t 6 In many ways the case is not applicable to the
primary questions raised by this article-it involved questions about
medical futility, a concept that has waned in succeeding years, and
federal regulations requiring emergency care-but it still provides a
compelling example of a mother's dedication to keep her child alive.
A strict application of my proposal would require withdrawing feed-
ing tubes from such children after a certain period of time, such as two
years, because there would not be any sense in considering evidence
of the patient's desires regarding continued treatment. In other words,
only the patient's experiential interests would come into play, since
she would not have any self-determining preferences.
Baby K is a hard case, as would be the cases of other children
who entered a permanent vegetative state after trauma or who never
possessed consciousness to begin with. After an adequate period of
time, however (and we might want to consider a different time period
for minor children), it seems that the overriding principle of disallow-
ing the instrumental use of the person should be honored and the feed-
ing tubes and other life support removed.
In some important ways, changing the presumption from continu-
ing tube feeding to discontinuing it may actually serve families who
is in the interests of family members is to continue tube feeding. In such a case, if the
evidence is sufficient that this is what the patient would want, feeding could be
continued.
214 In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
215 Id. at 592-93.
216 Id. at 597.
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are faced with these decisions. The' current presumption in favor of
feeding likely carries significant weight as a statement of our society's
moral judgment about what should be done. Rather than request that
feeding be withdrawn, even if they believe it is the right thing to do,
surrogates may be discouraged from doing so because it seems mor-
ally suspect when the presumption is to continue feeding. The contro-
versy over Terri Schiavo and the vehemence of protesters regarding
removal of her feeding tube may further cause family members to
experience confusion about what their ethical and legal obligations
are.
CONCLUSION
When those who fight for the continued feeding of people like
Terri Schiavo describe the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration as
"cruel starvation," the inclination of those who believe feeding should
be discontinued has been to deflate the emotive power of such claims:
artificial nutrition and hydration is medical treatment, we say; or the
person in a permanent vegetative state will not experience starvation,
so it cannot be cruel; or this situation is a far cry from the malnour-
ishment of children through neglect. Likewise, when proponents of
continued feeding tubes for people in a permanent vegetative state
make claims about the sanctity of all human life, we on the other side
have attempted to dismiss such statements as being religiously based
and narrow, rather than appropriately secular and universal. Or we
have pointed to the broader agenda of those making the sanctity of life
claim and charge that what is really behind this rhetoric is an interest
in protecting fetuses and embryos. If the proponents raise concerns
that withdrawing tube feeding from people in a permanent vegetative
state sets a precedent that will disvalue, harm, and ultimately kill other
people with disabilities, those who believe tube feeding should be
discontinued have turned to medical definitions to distinguish these
two groups of people, and again, to diffuse the passionate rhetoric
with dispassionate argument.
But those who disagree with laws that promote or even require in-
definite tube feeding of patients in a permanent vegetative state are
also justified in bringing passion to this debate. Continued feeding,
when pursued in the absence of knowledge that it is what the patient
would want, violates an ethical principle as important as the provision
of basic care, or the protection of life, or the equal treatment of per-
sons with disabilities. It violates the principle that we should treat
persons as "ends in themselves" and not as a means to others' ends;
that we should respect them as persons rather than treat them as mere
objects. In fact, this principle is much more centrally implicated in the
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continued tube feeding of people in a permanent vegetative state than
the principles asserted by those who advocate continued feeding and
justifies changing the presumption from perpetual tube feeding to its
discontinuation.

